Hungary's Spoke in the Wheel. How Brussels Slows Down Ukraine's and Moldova's EU Accession

The head of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell, addressed EU ambassadors with a speech earlier this week. He announced a course for geopolitical diplomacy. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen voiced a similar idea in her State of the Union speech in the European Parliament. She spoke about the current geopolitical priorities and acknowledged the past mistakes of the European Union.

But the visionary glimpse of EU leaders sometimes clashes with the old reality, which has not changed.

Ukraine feels this very well when its file manages European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi. At Kyiv's persuasion, the commissioner appointed from Hungary aims to slow down and block Ukraine's movement towards EU membership.

It also affects Chisinau. In the worst scenario, the bureaucratic games of the Hungarian commissioner can lead to a change of power in Moldova and the victory of pro-Russian forces.

This scenario, if it happens, would be a massive geopolitical defeat for the EU, contrasting with the glowing and promising speeches of Borrell and von der Leyen. It is still easy to stop.

Forget 2022

In mid-June, the European Commission made a revolutionary decision and recommended granting candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. Kyiv actively lobbied for unconditional status without any intermediate steps like "potential candidate." However, other decisions were worked out within the EU and surprised Kyiv, as numerous EuroPravda sources in Kyiv and Brussels confirm.

For example, the list of "seven requirements" that Ukraine must fulfill after obtaining candidate status. Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi personally came up with this list. That is why a few days before the decision, controversial, incomprehensible for Kyiv requirements had shown up in the list. It took the European Commission several months to "decrypt" them (like compliance with FATF requirements. The European Commission, in fact, has no significant concerns about it).

The European Commission made a deadline for the first assessment of the progress of Ukraine and Moldova: "The Commission will monitor country's progress in fulfilling these steps and report on them, together with a detailed assessment of the country, by the end of 2022."

And then something happened.

Exactly one week before the EU summit, this formula was changed. In their new decision, the member states instructed the European Commission to evaluate the fulfillment of the requirements by Ukraine and Moldova "as part of its regular enlargement package." This may seem neutral and even victorious for Ukraine, which has moved from "neighbour" to "enlargement package."

But in reality, it aims to slow down the assessment of Ukraine's fulfillment of the mentioned seven requirements (the same applies to Moldova).

The next evaluation of the enlargement package is scheduled for October 2022. Ukraine could not make it till this deadline. It means that everything is postponed until autumn 2023!

Zelenskyy's government willed to implement the "seven requirements" as soon as possible. They tried to convince Brussels to change its position and hold two or even three evaluations (for example, in December 2022 and October 2023), but they failed. They clarified that it would stimulate and correct the reforms based on the first evaluation. But it did not work.

The European Commission has no legal obstacles to an additional evaluation. The summit decision does not prohibit the Commission from taking additional steps and does not cancel the "end of 2022" in its initial decision.

However, this week the Commission finally put an end to these hopes of Kyiv and, in its new decision, refused any intermediate options.

The shift to 2023 has become real. It has become legally impossible to start accession negotiations before autumn 2023. Unfortunately, even this option also seems too ambitious to European Commissioner Várhelyi, delegated from Hungary.

Warning visit

Olivér Várhelyi visited Kyiv in late September, stressing that he came for the first time as a commissioner for enlargement. However, his conversations with Ukrainian officials did not add optimism.

The official press release following the visit mentions that the commissioner promised Kyiv a more meticulous approach to monitoring Ukraine's obligations. In reality, the signals were even tougher, sources say.

"Várhelyi said upfront that the negotiations will not start before 2024," one of the government officials related to the EU told Europravda. Another source was not at the meetings personally but was informed about their outcome, and saw the commissioner's signals even more skeptically:

"We were assured that Ukraine received a clear signal: as long as Várhelyi is in office, he will not start negotiations on Ukraine's EU accession."

Olivér Várhelyi's term as Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement expires in the autumn of 2024.

Other sources say that Várhelyi, as an experienced diplomat, avoided naming timeframes, but also admit that his statements were more than harsh. "He explained that he will monitor these criteria (seven requirements) so that it can last as long as necessary," one of the participants in the negotiations with the commissioner shared with the EP.

But the best evidence of real problems was a sharp change in assessments of Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Olha Stefanishyna.

She had no doubts in late August that Ukraine and the EU would start accession negotiations in 2023. She named the second half of 2023 a "cautious scenario." It is early October, and Stefanishyna says that it will be "difficult" to start negotiations even in late 2023, but Ukraine is working towards this goal.

Numerous EuroPravda sources say that Kyiv personally accuses Commissioner Várhelyi's of creating artificial bureaucratic obstacles to slow Ukraine's progress toward the EU. He allegedly worked in the spring to ensure that Ukraine did not even obtain candidate status in June, delaying the questionnaire submission to Kyiv and processing its answers. Only the personal intervention of the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who took control of the Ukrainian file, made it possible to overcome bureaucratic resistance.

Is it possible that von der Leyen will take a similar step now? This has never happened in EU history, but they discuss it, two EU sources said.

The Hungarian commissioner also leaves the European Commission dissatisfied. For example, for a long time, he has been slowing filling vacant positions in DG NEAR. If the redistribution of responsibilities will solve many problems, the EC president may do this.

Save Maia Sandu

We should keep in mind that starting negotiations purely for political reasons is out of the question. Ukraine really has to fulfill the seven requirements. Zelenskyy received signals about this from top EU officials, including von der Leyen and EuroCouncil President Charles Michel. In response, they were assured that Ukraine plans to fulfill the seven requirements ahead of schedule. Zelenskyy promises to adopt the necessary legislation by December.

However, the EU will still not be able to avoid political decisions about Ukraine.

Leaving the decision to the bureaucrats will give people like Várhelyi unlimited opportunities to slow down the process mainly because many elements from the Ukrainian "seven steps" and the Moldovan "9 steps" formulated by the European Commission allow arbitrary interpretation.

It is impossible to objectively assess the obligation to "enhance the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes at all levels" or "deliver on the commitment to fight corruption." These are the requirements for Moldova. All of them are very similar. Ukraine's ones look pretty much the same.

The conclusion based on such criteria depends on who evaluates them and with what attitudes.

Since the Ukrainian and Moldovan files are firmly connected for Brussels, a negative conclusion regarding one of the countries will lead to slowing down the accession process for the other as well.

However, if the European Commission really wants to become geopolitical, it should understand that this is dangerous. First of all, for Moldova.

In 2020, pro-European president Maia Sandu won the election in this small country with a highly fragmented electorate and significant pro-Russian sentiment. The following year her PAS party won a majority in parliament.

Maia Sandu has become a favourite of all Western capitals.

She does everything the way the West likes: she does not argue with her partners, does not take drastic steps (for example, in Transnistria); initiates new and new reforms such as anti-corruption.

However, we will see their effect in a few years. Therefore, in two years in office, Sandu could not convince the citizens that they did the right thing by voting for her and the Western vector. Back in May, an IDIS Vitirul poll showed Sandu's party losing to pro-Russian socialists, with only 18% saying they trusted Sandu more than other politicians.

The only sphere where Maia Sandu has indisputable success is international relations, including EU candidate status.

Meanwhile, in 2024, Moldova enters an election cycle: re-elects the president, and then the parliament. If the EU delays the start of negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, then Sandu will lose his last trump card. And if the status is granted right before the elections, this step will be perceived as a pre-election "bribe" and not as an illustration of the success of reforms under her presidency.

There is a chance that this very danger will become a turning point in the European Union's decision not to delay the next political step and to start accession negotiations with Moldova and, therefore, with Ukraine.

But this can be real only if the European Commission can exclude from the decision-making process or overcome the resistance of those who slow down the rapprochement of the EU with Ukraine and Moldova and act as a geopolitical player.

After all, Brussels made its promise. Now is the right time to make this promise real.

Sergiy Sydorenko
"European Pravda" editor
Chisinau-Prague-Kyiv