What assistance can Ukraine expect from Türkiye? Is it possible for Ankara to impose sanctions against Russia? These questions have become relevant again due to a noticeable shift in Türkiye's foreign policy.

What other support can Ankara provide to Kyiv? Why does Erdoğan still believe that the grain corridor will be restored?

Why is it advantageous for Türkiye if Ukraine joins NATO and regains its occupied territories?

Conversely, why is Ankara not interested in Russia's collapse, and how could this affect further support for Ukraine? Yevgeniia Gaber, a senior expert from the Centre in Modern Turkish Studies (MTS) at Carleton University, helps find answers to these questions.

Westward Turn of Ankara:

Türkiye's position remains unchanged, and all the changes we see are tactical steps within Türkiye's overall strategy. The positive aspect is that Türkiye's current policy aligns with Ukraine's interests. This alignment is due to both Russia's weakening influence and Türkiye finding more advantages in cooperating with the West.

Another reason is the Prigozhin "Putch", which showed Türkiye that Putin is not as strong as perceived. Türkiye respects strength, and they don't regard weakness favourably.

However, Türkiye won't completely abandon cooperation with Russia. Russia is its number one tourist provider and a significant energy partner. Türkiye still receives a considerable amount of gas from Russia, and they are constructing the Akkuyu nuclear power plant.

Nonetheless, the overall situation will lead Türkiye to be more accommodating to the West and Ukraine. Several primary reasons drive this, mainly economic interests. Türkiye needs money, investments, and the trust of Western investors. Previously, Russia provided some of this, but now Türkiye has to turn towards the West to achieve its goals.

Another crucial point is Türkiye's pragmatism and rationality. There isn't much to gain from Russia now.

Russia is sanctioned and considered toxic. Putin has broken all agreements, even with Erdoğan, who doesn't forgive such actions.

Assistance to Ukraine:

Currently, there is positive news related to Türkiye. This includes the return of the Azov Regiment fighters and the revival of military-technical cooperation. Türkiye is ready to supply weapons to Ukraine and continue the construction of the Bayraktar drones factory, as agreed before the conflict.

Moreover, there are breakthroughs in the sales of military equipment that Ankara was not willing to discuss previously. There have been talks about the Kirpi armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled howitzers Firtina. It is possible that this cooperation goes beyond what Ankara is willing to disclose publicly.

During President Zelenskyy's recent visit to Istanbul, Ukraine and Türkiye signed a memorandum of cooperation in strategic industrial sectors.

This development bothers Russia even more than the return of the Azov Regiment fighters because military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and Türkiye is what Russia fears greatly.

Furthermore, one can expect Ankara's support regarding the continuation of the "grain deal" and increased activity in the issue of prisoner exchange. Recently, there was an initiative from Saudi Arabia and Türkiye regarding the return of children deported from the Russian-occupied territories back to Ukraine.

The Return of the Azov Regiment Fighters:

The return of the Azov Regiment fighters was, to a large extent, a signal to Putin that if he allows himself to violate agreements with Erdoğan, particularly regarding the "grain deal" (an important image-building agreement for Erdoğan), then why can't Erdoğan make a corresponding gesture?

It seems to be a display of power-play between two strong leaders constantly trying to prove their superiority over each other.

However, Türkiye does understand, at a values and situational level, that Ukraine is engaged in a just struggle. This is evident in how the Turkish media covered the story of the "Azov fighters."

Initially, they were described as Nazis, fascists, and right-wing radicals. But now, the coverage and context have completely changed, focusing on the return of defenders accompanied by their president. This, too, was a signal to Putin.

Support for the "Grain Deal":

In Ukraine, it is essential to move away from a black-and-white perception and portrayal of Türkiye. From the beginning, there were expectations from the Ukrainian side that the Turkish Navy would provide military convoys to escort grain shipments (though Ankara never publicly announced this).

Hence, when it didn't happen, there was a wave of outrage suggesting that Türkiye is not providing ships because they fear Putin.

In reality, Türkiye maintains a very balanced position concerning the "grain deal". It is evident that Türkiye is highly interested in preserving the "grain corridors." Firstly, it's a diplomatic success for Ankara. Secondly, the agreement brings economic benefits to Türkiye. And thirdly, it allows Türkiye to maintain an image as a country caring for the Global South, providing grain to hungry children in Africa.

Thus, Türkiye will do its utmost to preserve this agreement.

However, I don't see any possibility of a direct confrontation between Türkiye and Russia in the Black Sea.

I don't envision any military operations or convoys provided by Türkiye in the Black Sea. At most, Ankara might use its commercial fleet to transport Ukrainian grain if Russia provides appropriate guarantees of non-aggression.

At the same time, it is evident that the Turkish President will urge the West to meet certain Russian demands to "motivate" Putin to return to the negotiating table and demonstrate Türkiye's impartiality.

"Red Line" for Erdoğan:

Under no circumstances will Türkiye transfer the purchased S-400 anti-aircraft missile system from Russia to Ukraine, even though this weapon system is not being used by Türkiye and is unlikely to have practical application for them. The purchase of the S-400 marked a crucial milestone in the history of Russian-Turkish relations. Therefore, sending it to Ukraine would be a public slap to Putin.

Even if the West were to offer incredible concessions to Türkiye in exchange for giving up the S-400, such as providing Patriot systems, F-16 and F-35 aircraft, Ankara would rather send the Russian system to allies in Azerbaijan or Northern Cyprus, but not to Ukraine.

Ukraine's NATO Membership:

For Türkiye, it is essential to have a strong Ukraine, and Türkiye has always supported our membership in the Alliance, just as they have supported Georgia's membership.

However, while consistently supporting Ukraine's NATO membership, Türkiye will refrain from making sharp statements that would provoke Russia.

For instance, recently Erdoğan stated that Ukraine deserves NATO membership. As far as I know, the Ukrainian side expected to hear that "Türkiye supports Ukraine's membership in the Alliance" rather than merely acknowledging Ukraine's worthiness for it. Nevertheless, if the matter comes to a vote in NATO, Türkiye will support Ukraine's accession.

A Strong Russia is a threat to Türkiye. So Ukraine's NATO membership moderately weakens Russia, making it advantageous for Ankara.

Russia's collapse:

Türkiye considers the potential collapse of Russia as a risk of ethnic conflicts and possible clashes near its borders. It could also lead to a new wave of refugees and destabilisation in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus.

Another aspect is Türkiye's sensitivity towards Kurdish issues. Therefore, the territorial integrity principle is crucial for Türkiye, which also helps it preserve its position on Crimea.

Furthermore, a significant weakening of Russia would mean a stronger NATO presence in the Black Sea region or a more influential Iran in the Caucasus and Central Asia. These scenarios are also unfavourable for Türkiye.

Hence, what Türkiye seeks is a moderately weak, controlled Russia restrained by the West and Ukraine.

Türkiye and EU Membership:

Before Erdoğan agreed to Sweden's NATO membership, he reintroduced the idea of Türkiye's membership in the European Union. It is a negotiating position because the issue of Türkiye's EU membership is not currently under consideration. The Cyprus issue and questions about democratic reforms in Türkiye have not disappeared.

However, taking such a step allows raising the visa liberalisation or modernising the Customs Union with the EU, which is crucial for Türkiye. Currently, there is a general impression that Türkiye views the European Union mainly as an essential economic partner with whom they need to maintain good relations but remain outside of as a conditional "partner with extended opportunities" beyond the EU.

This fundamental difference in Türkiye's perception of the European Union compared to its attitude towards NATO illustrates that NATO membership is seen as an important "security umbrella" by the government and the vast majority of the population.

Interviewed by Yurii Panchenko,

Editor, European Pravda