Orban's 11 demands: How Hungary crossed red lines again in blackmailing Ukraine on its path to the EU

"We are now sincerely committed to fully implementing the 11 issues raised – in particular, strengthening the protection of the rights of national minorities and to continue bilateral consultations with Hungary in this direction."

This is a fragment from a statement by Olha Stefanishyna, Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Ukrainian team in the negotiations on EU accession. She said these words in Luxembourg at the historic opening of these negotiations.

European Pravda (EP) has previously reported on Hungary's special role in first slowing Ukraine's progress to EU accession and then using demands as pretexts to blackmail Ukraine. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán agreed to the start of accession negotiations only if Ukraine publicly committed to fulfilling 11 demands from Budapest regarding the rights of the Hungarian minority in the Zakarpattia region of Ukraine.

To comply with Hungary's ultimatum, Stefanishyna was forced to make the statement above.

The problem, however, was that the Hungarian government has always been opposed to making the list of demands public.

Ukraine received the list from Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó back in January. Since then, negotiations have been ongoing for five months, but the Hungarian side has consistently opposed the publication of the list.

However, the Hungarian ultimatum in the EU has made this wish null and void. European Pravda considers it absolutely unacceptable that Ukraine undertakes international obligations whose content is not publicly disclosed. This might be possible within Hungary's frame of reference, but Ukraine is a democracy where government accountability matters.

Given the high public significance of this story, we are publishing the details of the Hungarian position and its most problematic elements. 

Some of the demands, in their Hungarian interpretation, are absolutely unacceptable for Ukraine. They will inevitably be rejected by both parliament and Ukrainian society. Others, though, make sense and can be implemented.

Bringing back the era of Yanukovych

At the end of January, during a visit to Uzhhorod, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó handed the list to Dmytro Kuleba and Andriy Yermak. Szijjártó himself referred to it as a list of "requests" from Hungary, which formally matched its content. In international politics, it is not customary to "demand" actions from a sovereign state. However, from the outset, Budapest's position was that Kyiv had to fulfil these requests. Even in official correspondence, it was referred to as a "list of demands".

The dependency of Ukraine's movement towards the EU on its implementation of the "requests" further reinforced this characterisation.

Essentially, Hungary is demanding the repeal of a whole set of legislative changes in legislation regarding minority ethnic groups that Ukraine implemented after the Revolution of Dignity (the Maidan revolution of 2014).

Hungary's idea is to restore the norms that were in place during the era of Viktor Yanukovych, the president ousted by the 2014 revolution.

Hungarian officials, including Szijjártó, openly acknowledge this and (not quite correctly) claim that since then, Ukraine has allegedly curtailed minority rights, which is prohibited by both the Ukrainian Constitution and international norms.

Of course, Budapest is not demanding the repeal of all laws passed since 2014. Essentially, the list identifies 11 problems, the resolution of which Hungary will consider an indicator of "restoring rights". Importantly, the Hungarians insist on specific details and the scope of Kyiv's solution for each point.

These details have also gradually changed and have been refined by the Hungarian side during negotiations, so the list is "live" and in some cases, its literal reading no longer reflects current demands. However, its essence – the core issues that the Hungarian side demands be corrected – remains unchanged.

Consultations on the document are ongoing. Several ministries and representatives of local authorities in Zakarpattia’s capital Uzhhorod are involved, among others. The list has also been shared with experts on Hungarian issues, representatives of EU institutions, and partner states, but it has not become public due to the expectation that Hungary might drop some of its demands.

Hungary has made concessions on several of its most controversial phrases.

For instance, Budapest's demand for the introduction of the concept of "cultural autonomy" in Ukrainian legislation (this norm indeed existed until 2023) met with a flat "no" from Kyiv.

After Russia's weaponisation of the word "autonomy" in Crimea, this term carries such a heavy connotation in Ukraine that it is not even worth discussing. This simply will not happen.

Hungary's most concerning demands

In January, when Minister Szijjártó brought his list to the negotiations, Ukraine underestimated the weight and significance Hungary had attached to it. Back then, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba stated that there was no talk of agreeing to fulfil Hungary's wishes. Instead, he promised to explain to his Hungarian counterpart why Ukraine believes that the protection of the ethnic Hungarian minority is already implemented, and that Hungarian-speaking Ukrainians in Zakarpattia already have the rights requested by Budapest.

The initial responses from Kyiv to Hungarian complaints were formulated in this manner. However, this approach did not work. Budapest stuck to its position and demanded changes in legislation. Additionally, the Hungarian government made the rather absurd demand that all details of minority and educational legislation be adopted in the form of laws rather than government or Ministry of Education decisions.

The fact that a foreign government demands Ukraine to pass certain laws is in itself outrageous.

One of the two most problematic demands is item number 11. Hungary demands the guaranteed representation of national minorities in the Ukrainian Parliament. 

This demand became one of the most problematic on the list and was rejected.

At first Orbán’s government wanted to impose the current Hungarian system, within which the representatives of several national minorities have representation in the Parliament, guaranteed by law, on Ukraine.

However, this idea turned out to be politically unacceptable, since it would require changing a protected article of the Ukrainian Constitution which is impossible without an all-Ukrainian referendum. Since martial law is in place in Ukraine, this idea is impossible. As a result, Hungary has already hinted about possible concessions on this issue.

Nevertheless, Hungary does not plan on giving up its idea to force Ukraine to cancel a legal demand for all elected officials to speak Ukrainian and to make speeches in council meetings in Ukrainian. In practical terms, it would mean that a Ukrainian of Hungarian heritage who does not speak Ukrainian could be chosen as a member of a regional council or even the Ukrainian Parliament.

The most challenging aspect has been determining places in Ukraine with a special level of guarantees for Hungarian rights. This provision is also provided for in current Ukrainian legislation: the relevant clause refers to cities and villages with a "significant number" of minority representatives (at least 15%) and with "traditional" minority residence (at least 10% over the last 100 years). In such cases, the local council can, for example, place road signs in two languages.

A key stumbling block is the designation of areas in Ukraine with a special level of guarantees for the rights of Hungarians.

In particular, this refers to the country's westernmost Zakarpattia Oblast, where, according to the 2001 census and previous years, the proportion of ethnic Hungarians was over 10%.

Secondly, Orbán demands the abolition of the 10% norm in principle, claiming that if even a small number lived in an area traditionally, then it is to be considered "Hungarian" territory. 

Thirdly, Hungary also demands that Ukraine abandon the decision-making process conducted by local councils in this regard and make the assignment of the "historically Hungarian" status automatic. This last point, incidentally, makes some sense: there have been cases where local councils refused to recognise this status despite the necessary percentage being met.

Fourthly, Hungary insists that only figures from the 2001 census should be used, although the number of Hungarians living in Zakarpattia has almost halved since then. 

The key point is that the Orbán government explicitly calls Ukraine’s refusal of this demand decisive for the entire set of 11 demands. Without it, they say, discussing the rest is pointless.

This is because Orbán sees that the proportion of the ethnically Hungarian population in Zakarpattia has fallen below 10%. Now Budapest sees a chance to use a historical opportunity to blackmail Ukraine into reminding these people of their Hungarian descent.

Another contentious point, in demand number 10, is Hungary’s failure to find a compromise on the use of Hungarian national symbols in local government bodies and municipal enterprises. Ukraine wants the list of such symbols to be approved by a Cabinet of Ministers decision, but Budapest opposes any restrictions. And this is not a theoretical but a very practical dispute: the symbols of the Hungarian minority coincide with the Hungarian state symbols. For example, many communities have a rule that at the opening and closing of all local council sessions, deputies sing the Hungarian national anthem. And when this strange tradition attracts the attention of the SBU, Ukraine’s intelligence service, they say that it is just a Hungarian prayer, and that its similarity to the anthem of another state is just a coincidence.

It makes sense that Kyiv wants to put an end to this. No compromise has been reached.

What concessions Ukraine has agreed to 

In previous consultations with Budapest, Ukraine made some concessions, even on contentious points. For example, the law requiring elected officials to know the Ukrainian language. From Kyiv's perspective, this requirement may seem indisputable and inviolable, but in some villages of the Berehove district, the situation can be different. If nearly all the residents in a village are ethnic Hungarians, how can they elect a Ukrainian-speaking village council? And what is the practical sense of the law that sessions must be conducted in Ukrainian?

However, even in the Zakarpattia Regional Council or the Mukachevo District Council, speeches by elected deputies in Hungarian would be strange. This discussion is still ongoing.

Rational considerations underpin almost all the Hungarian demands, and a compromise has been found on most points, especially on the language of education.

The only exception is Hungary's demand to restore the status of Hungarian-language schools (abolished by the 2017 Education Law). A more neutral formulation was found here – "general secondary education institution of the national community" (referring only to EU languages, and excluding Russian). However, Budapest's absurd demand that this status be granted to all schools where at least one class is taught in Hungarian remains problematic. 

This demand doesn’t make sense, but Budapest stands firm, and a compromise is not yet in sight.

The real reason for Orbán's intransigence is the same as with the status of settlements in Zakarpattia. The Hungarian government knows they are losing former "Hungarian" schools because, in some cases, Hungarian-speaking parents themselves are enrolling their children in Ukrainian-speaking classes. This opens up opportunities for their children to build careers in Ukraine, participate in political processes, etc. Schools are becoming bilingual, not just Hungarian.

Budapest wants to stop these changes and is using EU mechanisms to pressure Ukraine.

Is it mandatory to comply?

The answer may not be pleasing to many, but this is the reality: unfortunately, on the path to joining the EU, there will be many demands to amend Ukrainian laws. 

All countries from the latest waves of enlargement, which eventually became EU members, have gone through this path and these emotions.

These demands sometimes pertain to areas where there may not be common EU legislation, but there are common approaches – such as the rule of law, combatting corruption or respecting minority rights. Demands regarding minority legislation from neighbours, by the way, have surfaced in the negotiations of many candidates. Ukraine is not unique here.

However, while EU norms on trade, industrial standards and the environment are strict and non-negotiable (an EU member must implement them all, with discussions possible only about transition periods), in terms of democratic reforms, there is room to "fight back", proving that Ukraine’s legislation and its implementation are entirely European.

Therefore, implementing Hungarian demands should not be literal and automatic. 

After all, some of these demands are clearly inadequate and cross red lines.

It is also worth considering the legal status of the Hungarian list.

Fortunately, the list of demands is NOT FIXED in Ukraine's negotiation framework with the EU. This is a key legal point. Hungary did try to integrate it into the formal framework and at one point even received the agreement of European partners who did not understand its manipulative intentions. Peter Szijjarto even publicly announced this agreement, but later the situation changed.

Some unpleasant details did enter the framework.

These include references to the language of education and minority rights (which was predictable, as Hungary includes them in all EU documents regarding Ukraine). There is also a mention that Ukraine, on its path to membership, must also fulfil agreements with EU member states.

In addition, and "thanks to" the Hungarian government, the framework includes a very atypical clause stating that regulation of minority rights must be "in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine". The reason is Budapest’s mythologised norm of Article 92 of Ukraine’s Constitution, which states that "the rights... of national minorities... are determined exclusively by the laws of Ukraine". For some reason, the Hungarian authorities decided that this prohibits implementing any regulation of education or similar issues through less formal bylaws. 

But this will not become an insurmountable obstacle. Proving our case in these instances is quite possible. 

In particular, the concessions Ukraine has agreed to in principle must not be implemented until Orbán agrees to abandon the rest of his absurd demands. The principle of "all or nothing" should apply here.

The main unknown in this story is whether the Hungarian government intends to seek a compromise in principle. Are all tactical steps towards us just a cover, and the real goal is to block Ukraine's movement towards the EU? This cannot be ruled out. After all, Orbán has repeatedly shown through his actions that he does not actually care about the fate and rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine; for him, it is just a tool to achieve political goals.

We will find out the answer to this question in due time.

However, the history of the complicated relations in the Ukraine-Hungary-EU triangle proves that even when Orbán is determined to stop Ukraine's movement to the West, he still has to make concessions. After all, the rest of Europe is on Ukraine’s side.

The fact that Ukraine has opened negotiations with the EU, despite Hungarian resistance, is yet another clear demonstration of this.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda

Kyiv – Brussels

Translated by Daria Meshcheriakova