The post-Biden era: Five key challenges Ukraine will face with either Trump or Harris

Almost a month from now, on 5 November, the US presidential election will take place. US citizens will simultaneously elect a new president, a new House of Representatives, and one-third of the Senate. These elections are pivotal not only in American domestic politics, but internationally too. While the US is no longer the sole power to dictate the world agenda (as it once did), it remains the most important global player.

These elections are of utmost significance for Ukraine.

The US is a source of vital support that Europe is unable to provide. Let’s be frank: our survival as a country and as a nation depends on our ability to secure aid from the US. If we are to achieve this goal, we have to understand and navigate American politics. 

At the same time, we need to recognise that for the vast majority of Americans, Ukraine is not one of their daily concerns. This was confirmed by the recent vice-presidential debates, which were very US-focused in every sense – so much so that Ukraine didn’t even get a mention.  

That being the case, how can we continue to secure and maintain US support?

I will outline five points based on discussions I’ve had with both Democrats and Republicans.

First of all, Democrats and Republicans are no longer divided by mere political differences as they once were.  

It is now a clash of polar-opposite ideologies: an aggressive rejection of any form of social or racial discrimination on one side, and on the other, family, community and religion as the core values of life. These are two value systems that can coexist within the same country, but their adherents are not willing to compromise on issues they consider matters of principle.

Remember the uproar when Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described JD Vance, Donald Trump’s running mate and vice-presidential candidate, as "too radical"? The president was referring to Vance’s position on Ukrainian issues, but the outrage in the US had nothing to do with Ukraine. Vance is one of the key leaders of the New Right – the core of the new Republican ideology – and any description of him is viewed through that lens.

Incidentally, Vance is more supportive of Ukraine than many Republicans, who are prepared to cut off aid entirely – end of story.  

This story illustrates the point that while we must stand firm on Ukraine’s position in our dialogue with the US, we also need to listen to our American partners and understand that they are driven by their own priorities and hot-button issues, not ours. That won’t change after the election. Emotions run high during the electoral race, but they’re not going to vanish once the campaigning is over.

Second, these elections are not just about the US presidency.

Congressional elections will also be taking place in early November, and current forecasts suggest that at least one of the chambers will be controlled by the Republicans (who have a particularly high chance of gaining control of the Senate).  

This further underscores the importance of being able to listen to and understand American partners from both camps. Bipartisan support isn’t just a political slogan. Without it, we simply won’t receive any assistance. So the key is to ensure that the focus on Ukraine doesn’t diminish among either Democrats or Republicans.

After the election, Kyiv will face the challenging task of ensuring that the focus on cooperation with the future president and their administration is not perceived as political bias by the other party.  

This ability to walk a tightrope should be ingrained in our political culture.

Third, we need to realise that US attention on Europe will diminish, and that this creates space for Russian influence.

A shift away from Europe will happen regardless of the outcome of the US election, as challenges in Asia are far more pressing for Washington. Whichever one of the US presidential candidates wins, their rhetoric may change – Donald Trump will likely "discipline" the Europeans again, while Kamala Harris may encourage them to take more responsibility – but the result will be the same. There will be "less US" in Europe. And that means that European states will need to take more care of their own security, and of ours, as part of Europe.

If the US presence in Europe decreases significantly, there will automatically be louder calls for Russia to be included in the new European security framework, in one form or another.  

There will also be an increased desire to seek compromise regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations. Our joining the Alliance will change the security paradigm in Europe, but how exactly? When and how will accession take place? And will there be concessions in terms of timing and content? For now, these questions remain unanswered, and it is unclear whether the new US administration will get involved in answering them, and if so, how.

Ukraine has a right to take part in this discussion, but we face a political and emotional minefield whose intensity will depend on our state’s readiness either to adhere to the current all-or-nothing approach or to abandon it.

Fourth, despite all the differences between Trump and Harris and their teams, there is a risk that while their tactics may differ greatly, their strategies could end up being quite similar.

Trump, being unpredictable, might attempt to quickly achieve a de-escalation of hostilities but then lose his initial interest in Ukraine. This would present a challenge for Ukraine, since stopping the war doesn’t necessarily mean ending it. Trump’s unpredictability could also be a challenge for Vladimir Putin, however.

Harris, by contrast, is likely to be more consistent, relying heavily on her team, as foreign policy is not her strong suit.  

Both candidates share certain traits which present both advantages and risks for Ukraine.  

Preserving an independent and democratic Ukraine as part of the West aligns with US interests whether the next president is Harris or Trump. However, this does not mean that a pro-Western Ukraine is inherently valuable to them. Both candidates may be unwilling to bear the political, military and financial risks of reclaiming our territory or restoring the 1991 borders.  

Our assessment of the risks is fundamentally different from the American perspective. It remains an open question whether the next US president will consider the return of the Russian regime to "acceptable" coexistence with the West as a sufficient victory for the US, even if it doesn’t mean victory for Ukraine.

So there will be difficult discussions ahead with both potential administrations, especially when they expect us to present not a Victory strategy, but an exit strategy from the war.

Fifth, neither Democrats nor Republicans seem to fully grasp the internal risks facing Ukraine.

There are certain traits that have been crucial to helping us in this war which are almost absent in the West. Chief among these are our emotions, our determination to keep going to the end, and our ability to distinguish between good and evil, between "victory" and "betrayal".

All parties in the US emphasise that it’s up to Ukraine to decide how it sees the path out of this war. But as soon as the conversation becomes substantive, it becomes clear that not every option is acceptable – only those that "don’t raise the stakes". In other words, the US wants to make Ukraine responsible for choosing the future compromise, including the concessions Ukraine would have to make to end the war.  

The US’s reluctance to become directly involved in our war is understandable, but shifting the "obligatory initiative" for concessions onto Ukraine is unfair, especially considering the consequences such decisions could have.  

Of course we shouldn’t frighten the Americans with threats of potential societal destabilisation or even civil conflict. That argument won’t work. It is our duty, though, to explain the internal risks and challenges we face, as US officials often don’t fully understand them.

* * * * *  

Finally, we must mention the outgoing administration.  

We may have reasons to feel disappointed in President Joe Biden for things he failed to do, or for doing too little or acting too late. But I believe that after the change of power in the US, we will remember him kindly.  

After all, neither of the future US presidents will regard containing Russia as the number one problem on their agenda.

There are, of course, some positives to be found in this change. Biden’s view of politics is shaped by the Cold War era, and it’s difficult for him to fully step out of that mindset. The next president won’t have this limitation. Neither Harris nor Trump views Russia as an equal to the US (and the Kremlin's leader is aware of that too).

Joe Biden may still approve several important decisions for us before his term ends, because he, more than anyone else, sees Ukraine as an "American asset in Europe", not in the Russian sense of spheres of influence, but in the sense that a democratic Ukraine is and always will be an ally of the democratic US. 

However, there are no guarantees that the decisions Biden makes in these final months will be sustained under the next US president.

The election will usher in a new era of American politics, and we will need to find our place within it. This further underscores the importance of bipartisan support and the need to discuss and explain all the initiatives we promote to players on both sides of America’s political divide. Only then can the US become our true ally in terms of real security guarantees.

Biden won’t be deciding this now, but our number one task is to keep this issue firmly on the agenda of the next US president.

Pavlo Klimkin 

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2014 to 2019)