"The West is preparing Ukraine for negotiations rather than victory." An interview with Jerzy Pomianowski
Jerzy Pomianowski is a Polish career diplomat who has been based in Brussels for over a decade, leading the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), an organisation that supports democratic and civil initiatives worldwide, including in Ukraine.
Pomianowski has a keen understanding of how Western attitudes toward Ukraine and Russia’s war against Ukraine are evolving.
We met in Kyiv. Our conversation, deeply rooted in realpolitik, included points about the West's perspective on the war and potential "compromises" that might unsettle or even offend some in the Ukrainian audience. But these are precisely the sentiments that are increasingly present in European political discourse.
Rather than dismissing these viewpoints, they need to be understood and addressed.
Our discussion began with the most pressing topic of the moment: the changes that may lie ahead for Ukraine and the world due to the power shift in the US following Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election.
Here are the key points Jerzy Pomianowski shared, in his own words.
On changes for Ukraine under Trump’s presidency
Of course, such a clear change of administration will make a difference.
The only thing we know about Trump is that he is unpredictable. It is very difficult to guess what his next move will be. And the people he selects for different positions show that something is going in a good direction, something in a bad direction, simultaneously.
This unpredictability means that it will be difficult to make any long-term plans.
Every kind of deal, every kind of new idea will be rather short-term, and that will be the biggest change.
If Ukrainian politicians negotiate something with the US, they should always have in mind that it is going to be a rather short-term deal.
This requires different negotiating strategies. When you are a politician and you know something is going to be a short-term deal, you negotiate this differently than if you are planning a long-term strategy.
It does not necessarily have to have negative consequences.
Sometimes it is positive because if something is not working, you can quickly change strategy and jump to another deal and another deal. But in general, that does not help for good planning and the war strategy, and in that sense it’s going to be a negative factor that will make the negotiations more difficult.
I also advise against building long-term expectations based on the fact that Trump has chosen generally pro-Ukrainian candidates for Secretary of State and National Security Advisor – Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz.
Donald Trump is not just unpredictable, he is also known for changing people overnight.
So there is no guarantee today of how long they will stay and how long we can make our own strategies based on this selection, because within 6-12 months this may change. That is what I mean by short-term planning.
On the chance that Trump will "hand Ukraine over to Putin"
I don't consider that a serious scenario.
We need to keep in mind that there is a strong perception among the military community within the US that the war with Russia in Ukraine is extremely important from a strategic point of view, that it cannot simply be given up for some small political deals.
And despite some people trying to paint Trump as being ready to give up Ukraine for some kind of small deals, this is not going to happen. I don’t expect that the general support for Ukraine will change. Because with all the difficulties that his administration brings, there is something that we can call the US interest that Trump cannot overrule.
Similarly, he cannot overrule public opinion if public opinion says "We don't want war anymore, find a way to finish it up."
But at the same time, the US interest is to make sure that Putin is not going out of this war stronger,
because that would be against the US interest.
So here is a space where something could be more favourable for Ukraine or less favourable for Ukraine, but not like black and white, not totally negative.
On EU policy towards Ukraine
The new European Commission is formed and will start working soon. But we have to remember that the European Commission is not an entity by itself. Of course it has a huge influence, but in a strategic sense, it implements certain policies that are formed by member states.
The highest authority of the European Union is the European Council, the Prime Ministers and the governments.
The important unknown is the German government, as it will change after elections early next year.
Even if it is not that difficult to predict the name of the new Chancellor, we still don't know what the landscape will look like, because it depends how much the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) will get, and this may define whether the Chancellor’s mandate will be strong or weak.
But I am positive about the future landscape in Germany.
I think the CDU/CSU will have a rather strong mandate, and the new Chancellor will also have a strong mandate, and judging by today's statements, it looks like a positive shift from the Scholz policy vis-à-vis Ukraine.
This naturally goes in line with the strengthening role of Europe in every aspect of support to Ukraine – not only economically, but also militarily.
And we still have a very strong position in the UK – that is not changing despite the ruling UK party changing: Prime Minister [Keir] Starmer is maintaining a strong position.
I hope that pan-European support will be strong enough to give Ukraine the ability to manoeuvre, to strike those short-term deals with the US whenever the situation allows, and to prepare a better negotiating position for the future so-called peace talks.
On the West's intention to make concessions
I have this extremely strong voice in my head that is related to history. If you look into the history of 1918, there were two people – French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and US General John Pershing – who were saying: we cannot stop now, we have to go to Berlin. Because if we don't do this, we will have a war in 20 years.
And that’s what happened!
But the public, in France, in the US and the UK, were so tired of the war that they demanded an immediate ceasefire, immediate peace.
That's similar to what we see now with the United States’ approach.
That is the real danger.
That is something that is beyond Trump or beyond the Biden administration. Because if you have such feelings that would dominate in the public in Western Europe, in the US, then of course no politician will be able to overrule such pressure.
Because that’s how democracy works.
What we see today (here I am being absolutely blunt and down to the ground) is that the language of today's political discourse about Ukraine is a preparatory process for some kind of negotiations.
Not a preparation for victory.
On the perception that Ukraine is "tired"
How long will the EU be ready to continue supporting Ukraine in the war? In fact, the question is much more difficult. The question is how long Ukraine will be ready to fight, knowing that it requires suffering, it requires boys and girls dying.
It is a huge question, and sometimes we are not ready to share our true thoughts about this.
Of course, you are talking about foreign support here.
The weapons you needed were not supplied on time or in the quantity that was needed. While the US administration, but also Germany and others, were endlessly thinking and talking, Ukrainian people got tired, killed, or less ready to use the weapons that were finally provided.
Ukraine is not the first country to experience indecisiveness from its partners.
In 1939, Poland had a treaty with the UK and with France, but when Hitler attacked, we received almost zero help. They only declared a state of war with Germany on paper. Everyone in Poland thought we would receive hundreds of tanks, modern planes, and everything we needed, and nothing like this happened. In the history of the world, nations suffer from different types of non-support against existing obligations.
Ukrainian society can be angry with this reality, but you have no other choice than to fight. Because if you do not fight, Ukraine will not survive.
No one else will fight for Ukraine.
Here is where the role of Ukrainian society comes in. We at the EED believe that the whole of society in today's world – through social media, through advocacy campaigns, through different mechanisms – can communicate the will of the Ukrainian people to other societies. This is as important as official political negotiations. Especially now, when the international community is asking how society as a whole feels about this war. How much more suffering are they able to take? What kind of compromise are people ready to accept?
This is a message that should be delivered in people-to-people contact, heart to heart.
But at the moment, if an ordinary Polish or Belgian person talks to their Ukrainian neighbour, they receive mixed messages which are not only about Ukraine’s readiness to defend itself. People hear things like "I don't know what's going on there," or "Corruption is still high, because you can pay and cross the border."
This kind of cacophony that comes from ordinary Ukrainians all accumulates to one general message: that Ukrainian society is getting weaker than it was at the beginning of the war. This harms Ukraine.
That is why you have to find a way to change this communication. To wake up a certain solidarity at a different level. It is possible when you accept that you’re weak and need support from your western partners. That is beyond political messaging.
I'm not saying that will solve all the problems, but this is an element that is missing today. Ukrainian civil society can build it through fragmented approaches by Ukrainian people, NGOs with networks in European states etc. Ukrainians already have a lot of circles, and they can be activated.
Victory is not just about territory
What is victory for Ukraine? Let’s imagine that suddenly the Russians are gone from Ukraine and the borders are restored, but there is a strong military regime in Russia, "Putin 2.0", arming itself and reviving the economy to relaunch attacks on Ukraine.
I wouldn’t call it a victory if everyone expects another war in 3-5 years.
So the definition of victory that says "Let’s have them out of our border" is just a political metaphor.
The realistic victory is to make sure that Russia is not able to launch a war for another 50 years, or at least 25. Because that will allow Ukraine to grow, to become strong and democratic.
Territory is also important, but we need a solution that will disable Russia’s ability to relaunch the war after 2, 3, 5, 7 years.
The strategic objective to reach this goal is clear: Ukraine should join the European Union. And once Ukraine joins the European Union, investment is protected. So German investors, Polish investors, and other investors will come and invest.
And NATO is a part of this, too.
That’s why NATO membership and EU membership are two elements that cannot be given up in any future negotiation.
That is a key element that cannot be negotiated.
Because that is the main guarantee that Ukraine will be a wealthy democratic state that international investors are ready to invest in and people can safely plan their future.
The way to reach that lies through NATO membership, because if Ukraine is a member of NATO, Russia will not attack again. And the Russians know that – and that is the reason they oppose it so much.
You ask what would force the Kremlin to swallow Ukraine’s accession to NATO.
Losing on the battlefield always forces one side to end the war. So the way to reach it is to gain as much as possible on the battlefield and to make Russia suffer as much as you can.
That's why the Ukrainian demand for a symmetrical war that affects Russian territory is so important. Because someone who has launched a war of aggression cannot stay safe in their borders.
No, Russians have to feel the gravity of their decision.
You attack a country, you are counterattacked.
Peace through strength – this is the only language Russia understands.
On Ukraine's EU accession and the likelihood of a veto from its neighbours
Poland will definitely not veto Ukraine’s EU membership. Although some steps should be taken. And this is not about Bandera.
In Volyn, there are still mass graves where people were not properly buried with a ceremony, which is important in Polish Catholic tradition. This already belongs to history – eight decades have passed. But this historic gesture is needed from Ukraine, and this type of problem can be solved in a wise way. It's really about people's feelings.
In Ukraine, in Poland, in our region, history has always played an important role. And by not solving this problem, we are giving extra fuel to Russian propaganda. There are ways out of it, and I believe they will be used.
The border protests [by Polish farmers] are not about blocking Ukraine’s accession to the EU in principle. They are about taxes, tariffs, that were removed in 2022, and there are mechanisms to deal with this too.
In the EU-Ukraine accession negotiations, Poland can say: we need a 10– or 5-year transitional period where some conditions will apply. It was the same when Poland joined the EU and we received a quota for Polish sugar and Polish grain supplied to Germany and France. This is all part of the toolbox of EU membership negotiations.
When it comes to Hungary... that's a different story.
I cannot say with certainty that Budapest won’t block Ukraine, judging by today's declarations and the policies of Orban’s government. But even in Hungary, the government may change, hopefully, one day. And that will open the way.
Sergiy Sydorenko,
Editor, European Pravda