Poland's turn to lead: Tusk's challenge to Germany and the future of Ukraine in the EU

Europe places high expectations on the Polish presidency over the Council of the EU. Six months in charge of one of the European institutions is not enough to succeed, but the hopes directed at Poland go beyond this technocratic dimension.

They are as much a reflection of the leadership vacuum in Europe that Warsaw – for who else? – would have to fill, given country's growing economic and geopolitical pro-EU position.

But there are areas where Warsaw's European policy is also being redefined.

Firstly, the EU's defence policy, which is rapidly gaining ground under the influence of the war in Ukraine and Donald Trump's victory in the US. Europe needs to fundamentally increase defence spending and take more responsibility for its own security. This is a particular challenge for Poland, which has traditionally been sceptical of the EU dimension of defence policy.

Secondly, enlargement has returned to the EU agenda as one of its 'geopolitical' priorities. Poland, has always been an advocate of further EU enlargement. But now also finds itself in a role a country particularly affected by the potential consequences of enlargement, in economic and financial terms. It forces Warsaw to redefine its policy towards EU enlargement.

Thirdly, strengthening the EU's global competitiveness based on a low-carbon economy has become a priority objective of integration. This paradigm shift poses particular challenges for Poland, a country with a relatively strong industry and a particular dependence on fossil fuels.

In addition the map of Polish alliances in the EU and relations with its main partners is also changing.

This article explains how these unresolved strategic and political dilemmas can be solved and whether they limit the ability of Poland for leadership in the EU.

Twenty years on: Poland’s role in the EU and what comes next

Poland has been the biggest beneficiary of European Union membership. The combination of the single market and cohesion policy, along with the support for state institution-building has created a favourable environment for economic growth.

Polish GDP doubled between 2004 and 2022, climbing 40% higher than in an alternative scenario in which Poland would not have joined the European Union. With a few exceptions (such as shipbuilding industry), the EU economic model has worked extremely well for Poland. Participation in the common market and fundamental reform of state institutions during the accession process played the key role here, even more important than EUR 235 billion of European funds flowed into Poland between 2004 and 2022.

However, the years of success of Poland and other new EU members were largely years of stagnation for the 'old Europe' and crisis for southern Europe.

Today, however, this may be changing.

Poland's success in the Union was due to the relative solidity of its new institutions, social consensus, but also an economic model based on low labour costs. This model is running out of steam. Labour costs are rising, and the Polish economy is beginning to be blocked by its dependence on highly emissive coal, the extraction of which is extremely expensive. In 2023 over 60% of Poland's electricity was generated from coal.

The social consensus around EU membership is still strong, but increasingly eurosceptic voices are breaking through, especially on migration and climate policy. Also, political consensus has been eroded during the eight years of PiS rule, with permanent conflict with European institutions.

The logic of the European cohesion policy has also weakened in recent years, with imposed conditionality on climate issues and the rule of law.

Therefore,

the ability of Poland to benefit from integration depends on whether Poland manages to shape changing EU's priorities

with its own long-term modernisation strategy.

Depending on the scenario, future European integration can become again a key driver of Poland's development, it may also deepen country's weakness. The Polish Presidency will start shaping this way.

Russian aggression that changes the Union

Russian invasion to Ukraine in 2022 has triggered a fundamental change in the approach to defence. President Trump's victory may further break the EU taboos in this field.

For Poland it’s a familiar domain.

The watchword of the Polish Presidency is security in almost all areas: economic, internal, information, energy, food and health and, above all, military. The building of a defence union is, moreover, an objective present in all the relevant plans of the European institutions for the next five years.

Although, for many years, it was not Warsaw but mainly Paris who advocated that the Union should become independent of the US in the defence domain. Poland, like many Eastern European states, looked sceptically at these plans. Until recently, it seemed as a threat to the preferred division of tasks, in which the EU is responsible for deepened economic and political cooperation and NATO is responsible for military cooperation. 

In 2022, the use of the European Peace Facility to finance the purchasing military equipment for Ukraine, represented a symbolic crossing of the Rubicon by the EU. Poland is one of the main beneficiaries of this instrument – it is due to receive EUR 2 billion after Hungary unblocks the reimbursements.

A key challenge will be the financing of European defence.

In the coming 10 years, EU should allocate an additional EUR 500 bln, says Ursula von der Leyen. Poland, which intends to spend 4.7 per cent of its GDP on the military in 2025 (186 billion PLN or more than 43 billion EUR), is already bearing a significant part of this effort, but the chances of all EU countries generating such large funds from their national budgets are slim. Currently available EU funds are disproportionately low: only EUR 1.5 billion is available until the start of the next budget perspective.

Warsaw supports a proposal put forward by Andrius Kubilius, the commissioner responsible for the European defence industry. Kubilius suggests joint borrowing should be carried out only by a coalition of willing countries. This paves the way to avoid requirement for unanimity. And as it would not be an EU initiative – United Kingdom and Norway could participate too.

There’s also a discussion about objectives of this expenditure.

Warsaw insists on importance to prepare Europe for a possible invasion in four years' time, therefore the emphasis should be primarily on filling gaps in armaments, with purchases where they are currently available.

An alternative approach – favoured in particular by France or Italy (which, unlike Poland, are large arms producers) – raises the need to invest primarily in the European arms industry.

Warsaw also wants to include in the framework of EU defence policy is the construction of ‘East Shield': fortifications, joint missile and anti-aircraft protection in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Here also comes Polish-Greek initiative for creation of a European 'Iron Dome', the missile defence which should be recognised as a European public good, as it is necessary to guarantee the security of the continent.

Ways to end the war

Another fundamental issue that is closely related to the development of European defence capabilities is the role of the EU in peace negotiations and possible security guarantees for Ukraine. Poland's position is that an invitation to join NATO would be the best solution.

Warsaw remains very cautious about the ideas raised, above all by France, of sending European troops to Ukraine to stabilise a possible ceasefire agreement. Warsaw points out that the lack of a guarantee of US support for such an operation would mean a huge risk and crossing the Rubicon in a security partnership with the US.

Second, the use of European resources for an operation in Ukraine would certainly affect current NATO defence plans.

Third, the presence of Polish troops in Ukraine is considered problematic by some Polish decision-makers for political and historical reasons.

Fourth, the topic is politically controversial with Poland facing a crucial presidential election in May 2025.

In any case, the situation in and around Ukraine will further shape Poland's approach to defence cooperation in Europe, the transformation of which has only just begun.

Ukraine's EU bid: Poland is an advocate or a rival?

The war in Ukraine resurrected the enlargement policy, which had effectively been blocked since 2013.

Poland has traditionally championed the Union's enlargement policy, seeing it as a key instrument for ensuring stability and democratisation in the EU neighbourhood. Geopolitical considerations became more important after the outbreak of war in Ukraine. But economic arguments were also important.  Ukraine is an important trade partner and a potentially large market.

Nevertheless, a new phase in Ukraine's relations with the European Union has led to cracks in Poland's image as an unconditional advocate of the eastern neighbour's integration.

Relations with Ukraine have significantly worsened since the spring of 2023, when Poland, influenced by protests from agricultural organisations, called for a revision of the European Union's June 2022 decision to lift tariffs on Ukrainian imports. In 2022, imports from Ukraine surged by 42.9%, largely due to an influx of cereals and oilseeds, which had rarely been imported before the war.

In April 2024, the EU introduced import quotas for particularly sensitive agricultural products, such as poultry, eggs, sugar, oats, corn, groats, and honey. However, this mechanism is set to expire in June 2025, meaning further negotiations between the EU and Ukraine will be required in the first half of the year, with Poland likely aiming to play a significant role.

From November 2023 to January 2024, Polish haulage companies staged a blockade of road border crossings, protesting against what they perceived as unfair competition from their Ukrainian counterparts. Protesters claimed that Ukrainian drivers were increasingly transporting goods within the EU and that Ukrainian drivers were not bound by EU labour and environmental regulations.

Poland was among the countries calling for a revision of the EU-Ukraine Agreement on Road Freight Transport.

In response, the agreement was amended to include a new "safeguard clause," which would allow the suspension of the agreement in specific geographical areas if it caused "serious disruption" to the local road transport market.

Additional changes included requirements for drivers to present documentation proving they were authorised to carry out international transport, evidence linking unladen operations to transit or bilateral operations, and measures to combat fraud or the falsification of drivers' documents. These changes seem to have stabilised the situation at the border.

Further integration of the Ukrainian market into the European one will remain a key problem and challenge for Polish policy towards EU enlargement.

At the same time, the gradual integration of Ukraine into the European market will be a key element of the EU's policy towards Ukraine in the pre-accession period. Finding the right balance will be a task of high political sensitivity in Poland that may generate tensions and crises also in the years to come.

No less important are the bilateral issues between Poland and Ukraine, which may cast a shadow over the enlargement policy.

For North Macedonia, bilateral issues of a historical, linguistic and political nature, have led to series of real crises in the enlargement process. In the case of Poland and Ukraine, when the countries are also linked by a difficult and complicated, partly also bloody history, such risks are high. Although there are voices in the Polish debate not to link this debate with the issue of EU membership, the opposite view proved to be dominant.

This deterioration of relations will be partly mitigated during the Polish Presidency: the first cluster in the negotiations (fundamentals) will probably be opened, perhaps the opening of the cluster on foreign and security policy will be accelerated.

This does not change the fact that the most important decisions on enlargement are still to come.

The key in the negotiations will be the so-called transition periods, which, together with other basic parameters of accession, will be defined in the Accession Treaty. This will be a key element of the Polish position, above all regarding certain agricultural commodities – Poland will press for time to give itself a chance to transform, for example, agriculture in areas threatened by Ukrainian competition.

It does not seem realistic to discuss a change in voting within the Union for the time being – here Poland has a rather conservative position. During his first visit to Brussels, Tusk stressed that "revolutionary changes are not needed," regardless of France and Germany's position on EU reforms.

Decarbonisation and competitiveness: a race against time

The story of Polish development over the last thirty years contrasts with the trajectory of economic development in the Union as a whole: Poland was one of the fastest-growing countries in the world, while other EU countries were losing ground. Meanwhile it certainly was the model of functioning of the Union who helped Poland in this.

The common market, state modernisation and huge transfers from the EU budget were the locomotive of convergence, of which Poland was the biggest beneficiary.

But that period is coming to an end.

Poland is catching up with the EU average, and the EU has been changing its model to one that is much more demanding for Poland. 

The EU is also keen to support the innovation, new technology sector and the digital market. In this area, the potential of Polish players is limited.

Decarbonisation, another EU's new priority, remains a particularly contentious issue in Poland whose energy system that is still the most coal-dependent in Europe.

As the EU tightened its emission reduction targets (55% by 2030) and implemented measures such as the Fit for 55 package, the divergence between EU policy objectives and Poland's economic model and energy transition efforts became increasingly pronounced.

The phase-out of coal and the shift to a low-carbon economy have long been controversial in Poland due to the significant short-term economic and social costs. Although Poland has made notable strides in recent years, particularly in renewable energy investments and emissions reductions, the pace of change has been insufficient given the scale of the challenges and the need to align with EU policies.

This lag represents perhaps the most significant shortcoming of Poland's two decades of EU membership.

As much as 85 per cent of energy in Poland comes from fossil fuels, and the energy sector itself is one of the most carbon-intensive in Europe. In 2018, coal accounted for 82% of Poland's electricity production, dropping to only 63% by 2023.

By comparison, coal's share in the EU's overall electricity generation was just 16% in 2022. Czechia, which ranks second in coal dependency, generated only 43% of its electricity from coal.

Coal is also the source of fuel for 30% of individual households, while district heating is also based mostly on coal. 

It is estimated that meeting EU energy policy requirements would cost Poland €527.5 billion. However, the price to be paid by avoiding or delaying the energy transformation is much higher in the long term. In 2022, the cost of importing fossil fuels reached an all-time high of PLN 193 billion (around €41 billion).

The substantial short-term costs creates reluctancy for decision-making with caution, given the potential social and political consequences. Poland is so far the only country in the EU that has not announced date for moving away from coal combustion

The challenges are not only in the energy sector, but also, and most importantly, in the decarbonisation of industry which accounts for 20 per cent of Poland's GDP (one of the highest rates in the EU).

For two decades of Poland's EU membership, the development of industry was largely based on low labour costs, well-educated staff and relatively cheap energy. But these engines of growth are running out, while energy prices for industry in Poland – due to rising carbon emission costs – are today the highest in the EU.

These dilemmas and considerations shape the Polish approach to the EU's economic and energy agenda and some budget issues.

Poland and friends

In the intergovernmental dimension, which is crucial for the functioning of the Union, the partnership between France and Germany has always been considered particularly important. This partnership is in crisis today (both countries are also in crisis internally), but other countries' attitudes to Franco-German leadership are also changing.

This also makes a change in the logic of decision-making in the Union. Today, Germany can be outvoted in the Council of the European Union (as in the case of the directional decision on tariffs on Chinese electric cars).

At this background, Poland demanding a place at the adult table.

One of Poland's strengths is Donald Tusk's personal position: he is comfortable at the intergovernmental level.

Today it seems that Tusk will want to play a role in ending the war in Ukraine and in shaping European policies in such a way that they do not harm Poland's development.

So far, the Weimar Triangle with France and Germany remains the most important format of international cooperation for Poland, although this cooperation faces many problems – not least because of the difficulties in Franco-German relations.

A significant development of the last year has been the shift of Poland from the Visegrad Group to the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) – mainly due to a similar perception of the Russian threat. However, there are many indications that also on the shaping of the single market, these countries can play together – so that European economic governance is not dominated only by France and Germany.

The crisis of the Visegrad group seems to be permanent: Hungary, but also Slovakia have a completely different perception not only of Russia, but also of China, which distances them from Poland.

Could Poland lead the way?

Poland assumes the Presidency of the Council of the EU not only at a crucial moment for Europe, but also in a situation where Poland also re-evaluate its European policy.

It is not only the Union that is facing a fundamental transformation today. The same is true for Poland.

At the same time, expectations are focused on Poland to fill the leadership gap that the Union so badly needs today. Warsaw certainly has many strong assets to take on such a role. Donald Tusk is one of the most experienced politicians in Europe. No less important is the fact that the history of Europe is being played out today in Central and Eastern Europe, as the war in Ukraine will largely determine the future of the continent and its integration.

In stepping into this leadership role, Poland is not guided by a comprehensive and ambitious vision of Europe, the necessity of which Donald Tusk has always questioned. Summing up his five-year term as head of the European Council, Tusk said: "In our thinking about the future of Europe, we should be guided by common sense and a sense of timing".

Transition of the EU presidency from Viktor Orban to Donald Tusk, which took place on 1 January, has a symbolic dimension. These two politicians today best represent radically different approaches on the key dilemmas facing the Union: on Russia, on liberal democracy and on EU solidarity and unity.

This is not the first time that the history of Europe is decided in Central Europe. But perhaps for the first time it is the one that has the chance to significantly influence its course. 

Piotr Buras, director of the Warsaw Bureau of the European Council of Foreign Affairs (ECFR)
Michał Matlak, adviser at the European Parliament, European Center for Constitutional Research at the University of Łódź