Kremlin’s hybrid strategy in Transnistria: Moldova’s crisis, Ukraine’s chance, and threat to EU integration
On 1 January, Transnistria, a Russia-controlled breakaway region of Moldova, entered an energy crisis of unprecedented scale.
Following Ukraine’s refusal to extend an agreement allowing Russian gas to transit Ukraine, the region’s population of 300,000 has been left without gas, heating and hot water. Cold water is supplied intermittently. All (!) industrial companies have been shut down. Periods of power outages are constantly increasing, now reaching up to eight hours per day. The hours when power is still available may soon stop completely as the only thermal power plant in the region is running out of coal.
The paradox is that this crisis is not the result of a blockade or hostile actions from neighbouring states. The Republic of Moldova is striving to prevent a humanitarian disaster and assist its citizens by offering to purchase gas on the European market. Transnistria rejects this option for now, instead waiting for help from Russia.
This narrow strip of land, stretching 200 kilometers along the Ukrainian border, has been calling itself a sovereign state for over 30 years, but no country in the world has recognised its independence. The existence of Transnistria has been possible only due to the presence of Russian military forces and Moscow’s financial support. Moldova considers this presence illegal.
Now, however, the Kremlin is implementing a new scenario in Transnistria.
Russia is deliberately creating an energy and humanitarian crisis in the region.
This crisis has also impacted the rest of Moldova. At the same time, Russian propaganda is working to shift the blame onto Moldova’s current government.
This plan is centered on the parliamentary elections in Moldova, which are due to be held in autumn 2025. The Kremlin’s goal is to replace Moldova’s current pro-Western government with a pro-Russian one and to block the country’s further alignment with the West.
Moreover, this scenario poses new threats to Kyiv. It could slow down or even halt Ukraine’s European integration.
Gas and information wars
The energy crisis in Transnistria did not come as a surprise. Last year, Ukraine repeatedly warned that it would not extend the contract allowing Russian gas to transit its territory.
For many years, Transnistria’s economy was built around the consumption of gas that Russia provided for free, passing through Ukraine. Russia could have continued its gas supply in 2025 by rerouting it through Türkiye, Bulgaria and Romania, but in December, Moscow announced that it would stop supplying gas to the region under its control.
The regional authorities reassured the people that this tragedy would not happen, claiming that they had enough coal at the thermal power plant to last through the winter. But things did not go as planned.
The region with 300,000 people, where half the population lives in high-rise buildings, found itself without gas, heating and hot water. Amid freezing temperatures, people’s attempts to heat their homes using electricity overloaded the power grid. In Transnistria, rolling blackouts were introduced, with electricity now unavailable for at least eight hours a day. Coal supplies are running out faster than expected. By early February, the power plant will be forced to shut down.
Despite all this, the administration continues to reassure people that everything is under control, without providing any details.
The main focus of the official propaganda of both Transnistria and Russia, however, is to convince the people that
the culprit of the crisis is Moldova and its current government led by President Maia Sandu.
Accusations are being made that defy logic and geography, such as "Moldova cut off gas to Transnistria" and "Moldova organised an energy blockade of Transnistria."
The Moldovan government has denied these claims.
The conflict between Tiraspol (the capital of Transnistria) and Chișinău (the capital of Moldova) seems strange. The crisis could have been an opportunity for reconciliation, but instead, Transnistria chose a blame game. Tiraspol also rejected Chișinău’s offer to help buy gas, even when Chișinău promised to find Western financing for a transitional period.
The authorities in Transnistria continue to wait for free gas from Russia, acting as if the supply will resume very soon. The regional administration, for example, has decided to resume school classes on 20 January. What grounds are there to expect that schools will have heating or at least electricity by that time?
A price shock to Moldova
The problems faced by the rest of Moldova are considerably milder. Previously, Moldova consumed electricity generated in Transnistria, but now it has to buy it from Romania, with rates doubling.
Tiraspol and Moscow are making efforts to ensure that this price increase is felt as painfully as possible in Moldova. Russian propaganda, which remains strong in Moldova, tells the people that the price hike is the personal fault of Maia Sandu and her government. They claim that she refused to negotiate with Moscow for cheaper gas (a false accusation), and now both banks of the Dniester are suffering.
This leads us to the main element of the Kremlin's plan.
To show that pro-Western President Sandu is unable to negotiate a gas deal, Moscow may present the opposite example. Most likely, a pro-Russian politician from Moldova will head to Moscow soon and return with gas from Putin. The narrative will be that the entire problem lies with Sandu. "She makes you pay more just so Moldova doesn't get along with Russia."
Chișinău is convinced that the Kremlin is preparing exactly this scenario.
This performance is being staged for the parliamentary elections in 2025. People are being convinced that if Moldova were governed by pro-Russian politicians instead of Sandu and her government, people would pay less.
Additionally, the pro-Russian politician, who may take the lead in the energy crisis artificially created by Russia, could restore the gas supply to Transnistria, gaining a reputation as a national hero who saved people from a humanitarian disaster.
Who will become this "saviour"? This remains unknown. It could be Igor Dodon, or Irina Vlah, the former leader of the Gagauzia region, or the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, who lives in Moscow and has become a Kremlin favourite in recent years.
Why is this a threat to Ukraine?
The next parliamentary elections are a matter for Moldova’s voters. However, the outcome of these elections will have a decisive impact on Ukraine as well.
The particular circumstances of the 2025 elections mean that if pro-Russian forces win, Russia's influence on Moldova will be cemented for many years to come.
The reason is that following these elections, the issue of Transnistria's reintegration will inevitably arise. The economy of Transnistria will need restructuring after the end of gas transiting Ukraine. The era of unlimited free gas from Russia has ended. However, the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova is a difficult and costly process. Transnistria’s technical development is stuck in the 1990s, and enormous resources would be required for its modernisation.
An even greater challenge is electoral.
It’s worth noting that in the 2024 referendum, slightly more than 50% of Moldovan voters supported the pro-EU option. Transnistria has a population of about 300,000, the vast majority of whom have pro-Russian views. Their inclusion in Moldova (which has a population of approximately 2.5 million) would radically alter the electoral balance in favour of Russia.
Much will depend on the model of reintegration chosen. Will the new Moldovan parliament agree to grant Transnistria a veto on the country’s foreign policy decisions, as Russia demands? If Moldova elects a pro-Russian parliament in the autumn of 2025, such a prospect becomes very real.
If this happens, it will mean the end of Moldova’s EU integration.
But it will also mean the end of Ukraine’s EU integration.
Officially, the EU says that each country joins the bloc individually. However, in reality, for many countries, Ukraine and Moldova are considered a single "enlargement package."
For example, Romania is currently one of the strongest advocates of the joint accession of Moldova and Ukraine. But if Moldova were to disappear, the Romanians would not promote Ukraine’s accession. Similarly, Italy and France, for whom Moldova holds particular significance, would lose enthusiasm for Ukraine's EU ambitions.
Finally, a separate challenge is the status of Russian troops in Moldova and the preservation of the Russian military base.
A dangerous period
This is the best window of time for the Kremlin’s hybrid operation. The world is preoccupied with Trump, and right now no one (especially the United States) is paying attention to Moldova. In Brussels, the situation has been complicated by Ursula von der Leyen's illness. Germany is immersed in an election campaign, Macron is in the midst of a political crisis, and Romania is reeling after its elections.
Under these conditions, Ukraine could assume the role of geopolitical leader.
Especially since Kyiv has the resources to play this game.
Transnistria is refusing to buy gas and is waiting for an offer of free supply from Russia, but Ukraine can mirror this with its own proposal. It has enough gas to meet Transnistria’s humanitarian needs. It requires nearly 2 million cubic meters per day, just enough to restore heating, hot water, electricity generation for people, and restart vital businesses such as bakeries.
By the end of the heating season, 60-70 million cubic meters will be required, a negligible amount compared to the more than 12 billion cubic meters of gas stored in Ukraine’s underground facilities, according to official data. Furthermore, the EU could provide Ukraine with financial compensation for this volume. In essence, Ukraine would prevent a humanitarian disaster right next to the EU’s border.
Ultimately, it is highly likely that Tiraspol (under Moscow’s instructions) will even refuse free gas from Ukraine because this is not part of the Kremlin’s plans. However, in that case, the Transnistrian authorities will destroy the myth that no one came to the region’s rescue.
It will be clear that this entire situation is a performance staged by the Kremlin.
But to achieve this effect, Kyiv must act proactively, publicly, and quickly.
In short, the only condition for Kyiv's actions is the presence of political will.
Sergiy Sydorenko,
Editor, European Pravda
Translated by Daria Meshcheriakova