Easing martial law, reforms by 2027: what the EU expects of Ukraine on its path to membership
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Ukraine aims not only to start accession negotiations, but also to open all the negotiation clusters by the end of 2025.
No other country has ever launched the EU accession process this quickly in its current form, but Ukraine intends to make it a reality. This was announced by Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna at a conference titled Ukraine's Accession to the EU: Shaping the Transformation Agenda, where Stefanishyna also outlined the plan to achieve this record pace.
Ukrainian officials have made ambitious promises before, so this statement in itself is not a groundbreaking one. What is far more significant is that the European Commission has confirmed the same intention. Brussels bureaucrats do not make such assumptions unless there is a solid basis for doing so.
Nevertheless, Brussels has emphasised that Ukraine needs to meet certain conditions, some of which are politically sensitive.
Specifically, the EU expects Kyiv to ease restrictions under martial law, strengthen opposition rights, and take Hungary’s demands into account. And of course, the EU continues to stress the importance of reform.
Perhaps the best news from the conference was the statement from Ukraine's parliamentary leadership about their willingness to fulfil the EU’s requirements. Many rank-and-file MPs remain sceptical, though. Strengthening opposition rights is expected to be one of the most challenging issues, as opposition MPs doubt that the government is genuinely ready to take meaningful steps in this direction.
Nonetheless, there were some positive signals regarding compliance with EU demands, including from First Deputy Speaker Oleksandr Korniienko.
Parliamentarians, government officials, experts and Western diplomats all took part in the discussions at Friday’s conference. European Pravda’s editor closely followed the debates both during and around the event.
Equal expectations of Poland and Denmark
A major conference on Ukraine’s EU accession had initially been planned to be held in Kyiv at the end of last year but was postponed to 2025, likely in the hope that the EU would provide more clarity on opening negotiation chapters while Ukraine would be able to "tie up loose ends" regarding its most pressing commitments.
The latter, however, has not gone smoothly.
For example, in January, the Ukrainian parliament once again failed to gather enough votes for any of the bills aimed at repealing or amending the "Lozovyi amendments". These provisions, introduced into law back in 2017, created a corruption loophole allowing criminal cases to be closed. Over the years, sorting out this issue has become one of the key demands of Ukraine’s Western partners and some Ukrainian activists.
These demands are backed by the Ukrainian government and the parliamentary majority leadership. The business community, however, opposes the changes. As a result, there are currently not enough votes in parliament to break the deadlock.
On Friday, government officials and parliamentarians expressed the hope that progress would finally be made on this issue during the next plenary week. When European Pravda asked them, however, neither Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk nor Deputy Prime Minister Olha Stefanishyna, who has been actively advocating for this EU requirement in recent months, ventured to make any forecasts. Stefanishyna, visibly frustrated with the parliamentary dialogue on this matter, admitted that negotiations with European partners are sometimes easier than with Ukrainian MPs.
Indeed, the plans announced by the deputy prime minister, and even preliminary agreements with EU countries, appear more specific.
Ukraine has agreed on a preliminary roadmap for accession negotiations.
This pace of process is unprecedented for the European Union.
Kyiv is particularly counting on Poland's presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2025.
By April, Ukraine is expected to open the first negotiation cluster, Fundamentals, which includes anti-corruption measures, the rule of law, human rights and statistics. The EU and Ukraine now plan to open only the Fundamentals cluster first and not bundle it up with other chapters. This is a relatively recent shift. As recently as early January, Brussels sources believed that a "package approach" was the most likely scenario. This distinction is not just procedural. It carries significant implications, which will be explored later.
By June, under a preliminary agreement, the EU is set to approve the opening of two more clusters – Cluster 6 (External Relations, the smallest cluster, so Ukraine is expected to achieve rapid success here) and Cluster 2 (Internal Market, the largest and most demanding cluster, covering the core of Ukraine’s economic integration into the EU).
"If the Fundamentals are the soul of the negotiations, then the Internal Market is the body. Without that, we might strive for the EU spiritually but fail to reach it physically. That’s why the first and second clusters are crucial for us," Stefanishyna explained.
Poland’s EU presidency will be over in late June, and Denmark will take over the leadership of the EU Council. Kyiv has equally ambitious expectations of Copenhagen.
According to Stefanishyna, Ukraine plans to open three more clusters during Denmark’s six-month presidency, aiming to have all negotiation clusters open by the end of 2025.
Does the EU agree?
It’s important to emphasise that Ukraine’s rapid progress toward EU membership would be unprecedented.
No other candidate country has ever opened all negotiation clusters within a single year. The example of Finland from the early 1990s (completing accession talks in just two years) is not relevant here. At that time, not only did negotiation clusters not exist, but the European Union itself was still in its formative stages (from 1992 to 2009).
So far, the only candidate country to have opened all 33 negotiation chapters is Montenegro. It took from 2012 to 2020 to do so. Even Poland, which joined in 2004, needed two years (1998-2000) to complete this phase. And the EU was smaller back then, negotiation clusters did not exist, and the overall volume of EU legal obligations was significantly lower than today.
This raises the question: is the EU itself ready for such an accelerated pace, or is this just a Ukrainian ambition?
On Friday, additional reasons for optimism emerged.
Gert Jan Koopman, Director-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, joined the conference online. Reputedly sceptical of Ukraine’s "fast-track" ambitions, Koopman nevertheless voluntarily stated that opening all the negotiation clusters by the end of the year is realistic.
"There is a lot of trust, we see each other as partners, and I hope that based on this trust, we will be able to open all the negotiation clusters within a year. We very much want this, but ultimately, it will depend on you," Koopman said.
Such a clear statement from a high-ranking EU official signals that there is political will within the EU to allow Ukraine to proceed at an unprecedented speed. Koopman’s remark that this timeline "depends on Ukraine" deserves special attention.
The decision to postpone opening the Internal Market and External Relations clusters until June – separating them from the Fundamentals cluster – has political motives behind it and will have political consequences.
In reality, this delay is strategically beneficial for the Polish government, which currently holds the EU Council presidency. Poland is in the midst of intense presidential election campaigns, in which anti-Ukrainian voices are unfortunately quite prominent. As a result, the Polish government has an incentive to defer this major pro-Ukraine decision in Brussels until after the election.
There is no doubt, however, that certain voices within the EU will be advocating for additional tough conditions to be imposed on Ukraine before this decision is made in June.
If you were thinking of Hungary there, you were right. Koopman’s speech contained a clear warning to the Ukrainian government. He reminded Kyiv about "an element to which one EU member state pays particular attention" – a clear reference to Hungary’s concerns over national minority rights.
"I would encourage everyone, especially members of the Rada [Ukraine's parliament], to move forward with the implementation of the national minorities action plan, as this will impact the pace of your accession negotiations," Koopman emphasised.
However, it would be a mistake to reduce everything to the Hungarian issue alone.
From opposition to elections
Despite Koopman’s positive remarks about Ukraine’s rapid accession process, much of his speech was framed as a warning signal for Kyiv. The discussion at the conference confirmed that Ukrainian officials received the message loud and clear.
Koopman outlined three key issues that the EU considers when assessing the stability of democracy in candidate countries.
Firstly, readiness for elections.
The EU is not pushing Ukraine to hold elections during the war. Brussels understands the constitutional constraints, security risks, and the impossibility of running proper campaigns. However, the EU does expect some preparation for post-war elections, particularly with respect to reforming electoral legislation where necessary. There were no specific demands relating to this in Koopman’s speech.
Another key focus of the EU’s assessment is civil society rights. Ukraine faces no significant criticism there.
The most problematic of the "big three" is the rights of the opposition in Ukraine, and here the EU does have concerns.
The Friday conference further illustrated tensions in this area.
"We want to see that all parliamentary parties participate in discussions and decision-making. The opposition must have space not only in parliament, but also at conferences," Koopman emphasised.
This focus on conferences (not the most crucial events for politicians) is no accident.
The fact is that at this EU accession conference, the balance was clearly skewed. There were four MPs from the ruling Sluha Narodu (Servant of the People) party on the panel and only one opposition MP (from the Holos (Voice) party). This had sparked outrage from the chair of Ukraine's parliamentary committee on European integration, former deputy prime minister Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (a member of the European Solidarity party), who was not invited to speak at the event. Koopman’s remark indicates that this had not gone unnoticed.
He added that the EU is also monitoring whether Ukraine’s opposition has sufficient opportunities for international engagement. Last year, opposition MPs frequently complained about restrictions being placed on their foreign travel. This issue is now subject to special EU monitoring.
Such a public rebuke of the government, delivered in the presence of representatives from numerous European diplomatic missions, could not go unanswered.
The response came from Oleksandr Korniienko, First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, who was speaking on the same panel as Koopman.
He did not deny the criticism. Instead, he sought to convince the audience that Ukraine is ready for change,
including on opposition rights.
"I can only join Mr Koopman in his call for us not to wait until we adopt a roadmap, open a cluster, and only then, sometime in the autumn, start improving opposition rights. No, this must be done now," Korniienko said.
He also assured the audience that the government is already making changes, even if they are not yet visible.
"If we recall the discourse a year ago, when no one was allowed to travel abroad – right now more than 40 people are in the US [for the National Prayer Breakfast – ed.], and the opposition presence there is even larger than the government’s," he noted.
Whether this public exchange will lead to real changes remains to be seen. But Ukraine’s pro-European politicians will have to overcome deep distrust along the way. This was confirmed by the remarks of the only opposition MP invited to be on the panel, Andrii Osadchuk from Holos, who accused the ruling party of pretty much usurping power – although he acknowledged that this is not a new problem for Ukraine.
"In 30 years, no political force that has gained control over the majority and the Cabinet has been able to restrain itself and act strictly within the Constitution and the laws on political influence," he lamented. "Everyone has wanted everything, not understanding that there are limits, that there is a fundamental separation of powers."
Osadchuk acknowledged, however, that some positive shifts have taken place under this parliament, such as the depoliticisation of judicial appointments.
Easing martial law
Beyond the political disputes, the main challenge brought up by officials – both European and Ukrainian, both politicians and experts – was Ukraine’s institutional preparedness for EU accession talks.
One key issue is the professional capacity of Ukraine’s civil service and the shortage of qualified personnel in government institutions.
This major consequence of the long freeze in competitive hiring for civil service positions, first due to the Covid-19 pandemic and then the full-scale war, was highlighted by several speakers, including Andrii Osadchuk.
"Whatever the Parliament or Cabinet adopts, these decisions must be implemented by the most professional people [in government]. But in Ukraine there is always a struggle between competence and loyalty, and often, loyalty wins," Osadchuk remarked.
Reinstating competitive hiring alone will not solve all the problems. There is also the issue of how attractive the civil service is, salaries and so on.
Government officials say changes are already in progress, partly under EU pressure.
"Yes, civil service competitions have been suspended. Therefore we need to amend the laws on martial law and civil service to reinstate the competitive selection process. This is a complex issue, but it’s completely doable. The EU insists on depoliticisation and has provided specific recommendations," Nataliia Aliushyna, head of Ukraine’s National Agency for Civil Service, explained.
The EU has been pushing Ukraine to reconsider certain wartime restrictions.
This was a key point in Koopman’s address.
"I would also express my understanding of the situation with martial law. It really changed certain democratic procedures given the security challenges. Obviously Ukraine will need to return to constitutional normality after the war is over and martial law is lifted. But I would really ask you to already assess the necessity and proportionality of the existing restrictions. Examine them thoroughly!" he said.
He did not specify which restrictions Brussels expects changes in, but government officials appear to be aware of the EU’s concerns.
Moreover, it is important not to forget the other, more "routine" tasks that Ukraine must fulfil on its path to EU accession. As has been repeatedly emphasised, progress in the Fundamental negotiation chapters – such as judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, and human rights – will be decisive.
Kyiv and Brussels are in the process of finalising the "roadmap" for the fundamental negotiation chapters 23 and 24. Ukraine's progress in implementing this roadmap will be crucial for advancing the accession talks with the EU in the future. The texts of the "roadmap" are expected to receive preliminary approval in the coming weeks. However, the document remains vague at this stage, and on Friday, the officials on the stage were even debating the exact number of points or measures it contains. Deputy Justice Minister Liudmyla Suhak, who is responsible for the roadmap, counted 474 measures that Ukraine must implement.
"We have set ourselves the goal of implementing these measures by 2027. It's ambitious, but we are confident that we will accomplish this task," she stated.
The lion's share of this work must be done by Ukraine's parliament, where problems have regularly arisen recently, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, specifically regarding the Lozovyi amendments. However, Oleksandr Korniienko insisted that understanding is growing, at least at the level of the parliament's leadership.
Korniienko himself said he had changed his understanding of the processes after a recent visit to Brussels, where he took part in the European Commission's technical work on preparing for negotiations. He says, however, that there are problems with broader understanding among many members of parliament.
"I spent three days in Brussels on screenings to understand what they actually want from us, and I realised that we still need to conduct an information campaign, starting with ourselves in parliament... One of the myths is that we need to act as we have often done in many international interactions, IMF programmes, etc. – i.e. to twist things, negotiate, try to do this or that (instead of fulfilling the initial requirements). But this will not work in the case of enlargement," he acknowledged.
Sergiy Sydorenko,
Editor, European Pravda
Translated by Daria Meshcheriakova
Ukraine's Accession to the EU: Shaping the Transformation Agenda was organised by the Office of the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, in partnership with the project 'Strengthening the Ukrainian EU Adjustment Process in the Area of the Rule of Law' (3*E4U), implemented on behalf of the Federal Foreign Office of Germany by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, and the EU Pravo-Justice project, implemented by Expertise France.