"Coalition of the willing" for Ukraine and the EU: how a new security alliance can save trust in Brussels

In discussions among European politicians and experts about Ukraine's future, one of the strongest arguments for Ukraine’s EU membership is the incredibly high level of public support for the EU among ordinary Ukrainians.  

Polls show that only 3-5% of Ukrainian citizens oppose EU accession, while support levels sometimes exceed 90%. This is crucial for European partners, as membership is impossible without public backing.  

The influence of this support on Ukraine’s domestic politics is also significant. At present, no political party that is not – at least rhetorically – pro-European has any electoral future in Ukraine. This makes it easier to implement pre-accession reforms, which in turn bring Ukraine closer to membership and strengthen trust in the EU.  

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this cycle of support can sustain itself indefinitely.  

The EU may soon face serious image problems in Ukraine.  

One reason is that many Ukrainians overestimate the speed of accession while underestimating the EU’s requirements. More importantly, there are unrealistic expectations about the EU’s ability to resolve crises and make bold decisions that Ukraine needs. It is crucial to recognise that the EU’s capacity in this regard is indeed limited.  

This scenario poses a potential risk for Ukraine 

Just as Ukraine’s exceptionally high support for the EU benefits the country, a decline in this support would inevitably create problems. Maintaining strong public backing for the EU is a shared responsibility for both Brussels and Kyiv.  

Fortunately, there are ways to achieve this.  

The EU should take inspiration from NATO’s successful experience. NATO faced challenges in Ukraine that were very similar to those confronting the EU, perhaps even more severe. These included obstacles to Ukraine’s accession, Hungary’s veto, and the Alliance’s limited powers and room for action. Given this, by spring 2022, trust in NATO among Ukrainians had already begun to decline.  

One of the tools that helped NATO reverse this trend was the Ramstein format. This initiative linked crucial military support efforts to NATO in the public perception, even though they were legally separate from the Alliance and did not require approval from member states like Hungary.  

The EU has similar opportunities to act in the same way and it should do so now, proactively preventing future image problems rather than reacting to them after they arise.  

The "coalition of the willing," which is currently being formed in Europe, can quite feasibly be linked to the European Union in terms of image without undermining the flexibility of this format. This would also give the EU greater weight in the security sphere and pave the way for new European security formats.

European Pravda explores these ideas in more detail in this article.

Trust in the EU is not unconditional  

Ukrainians have long favoured EU membership over alternative paths for the country’s development, but after Russia’s full-scale invasion, the desire for European integration has turned into a national idea. 

At certain points, polls recorded over 90% of Ukrainians expressing readiness to vote for EU accession. This figure is still frequently cited in European Commission documents on Ukraine, though in reality, such record-high support levels belong to the past.  

Nonetheless, the majority support for EU membership remains unquestionable.  

For Ukraine, the EU is the only viable choice, not just for civilisational and cultural reasons but also due to its geography and the proximity of Russia, whose goal is to subjugate Ukraine and eliminate its independence. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has made this clear even to those who previously tried to remain "apolitical." This is one of the key reasons for the surge in EU support since March 2022.  

The EU’s image in Ukraine is also strengthened by statements from European officials endorsing Ukraine’s membership and by frequent news updates on its progress toward accession. People tend to support goals they see as achievable.  

However, it would be a mistake to assume that Ukrainians’ trust in Europe is a constant that will never change.  

There are reasons to speak about a number of looming challenges.

The primary issue already becoming evident is the difficulty the EU faces in making decisions regarding Ukraine. The ongoing risk of decision-making blockades, often based on dubious pretexts, will remain a persistent threat, at least as long as Viktor Orbán governs Hungary.  

– Even in the context of EU enlargement, we will continuously hear about Hungary blocking the opening of new negotiation chapters or other procedural steps. This will significantly undermine public confidence in the attainability of full EU membership. 

– The situation is even worse when it comes to other ambitious steps expected by Ukrainian society. Many of them simply won’t materialise. Due to the EU’s consensus-based foreign policy decision-making, it will be unable to overcome resistance from individual member states like Hungary and Slovakia. 

– A significant portion of Ukrainians have unrealistic expectations about the speed of EU accession. In this regard, optimistic statements from Kyiv and Brussels might have a downside, leading to eventual disillusionment. 

– The large-scale pre-accession reforms that Ukraine must implement will undoubtedly face opposition. There are also reasons to anticipate information campaigns, both from external actors and domestic players with hidden agendas, aimed at discrediting reforms and, by extension, the EU itself. 

These four challenges are unavoidable, but additional risks could also emerge.  

Yes, the continuation of sanctions against Russia requires increasing efforts due to the need for unanimous voting. This week, Hungary took the first step toward undermining the sanctions regime by securing the removal of some oligarchs from the sanctions list. It would be naive to assume that it will stop there. It is even impossible to rule out that by summer or next winter, Hungary might say "no" to the extension of sectoral sanctions (for example, if the US lifts restrictions on Russia by then), effectively bringing the trade with the aggressor back to the "business as usual" mode.

If this happens and the EU fails to implement compensatory measures, Ukrainian society may perceive it as a betrayal by Europe. Even without the worst-case scenario materialising, disappointment in the EU’s ineffectiveness is likely to grow in Ukraine.

NATO’s experience  

International organisations often struggle with effectiveness due to their structural design, and the European Union is no exception.  

In early 2022, Ukraine faced similar issues in its relationship with NATO and in how the Alliance was perceived, but these challenges were eventually overcome. 

Support for Ukraine’s NATO membership also surged following the full-scale war, but unlike EU support, this shift was not stable. After the initial spike, there was a rollback, with the percentage of opponents rising sharply from 9% to 23% in March 2022.  

This shift resulted from multiple overlapping factors, including the Istanbul negotiations between Ukrainian and Russian delegations. However, the most fundamental reason, one that influenced both government officials and segments of society to consider abandoning NATO aspirations, was the absence of positive news from the Alliance. 

Unlike the EU, NATO was not even considering Ukraine’s membership back then. Even strong supporters of Ukraine’s accession, including officials and diplomats, privately admitted frustration over the lack of substantive decisions. The military aid that did arrive in the first months of the war generated mostly negative reactions, comparable to Germany’s shipment of helmets or the blankets sent by the Obama administration in 2014 – in both cases, Ukrainians’ reaction was outrageous. 

This inaction of the Alliance had structural causes. 

First, NATO, like the EU, requires unanimity for decisions, but in NATO, Hungary’s leverage is even stronger. Unlike in the EU, other members lack economic or political tools to pressure Budapest into compliance (such as trading support for Ukraine in exchange for financial benefits). Moreover, some ideas lacked backing even from key players like the US.  

Secondly, the Alliance does not have its own financial reserves or weapon stockpiles. Unlike the EU, it does not manage military aid funds. There is no such thing as "NATO weapons" or "NATO troops," all resources belong to individual member states, meaning the Alliance itself cannot deliver arms to Ukraine.  

Public expectations in Ukraine were vastly different. 

In such cases, explanatory campaigns rarely help resolve image crises. Telling people that "NATO has no power to act" would only fuel scepticism: why does Ukraine even need such an alliance?  

By April 2022, NATO found an asymmetric response to this issue – the creation of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, better known as the Ramstein format.  

Legally, Ramstein is not connected to NATO at all. It was initiated by the US, with meetings chaired first by American, then UK officials. However, in terms of perception and communication, the format became associated with the Alliance. High-ranking NATO representatives always take part in meetings, some sessions are held at NATO headquarters, and discussions often coincide with NATO ministerial gatherings.  

Interestingly, this was not a deliberate communications strategy. Initially, the US emphasised that Ramstein was separate from NATO. However, over time, this association emerged organically. While no formal sociological studies have confirmed this, there is a strong reason to believe that large segments of the Ukrainian public perceive Ramstein as part of NATO.  

Not a replacement, but a supplement to the European Union  

Let’s return to the European Union.  

The EU lacks effective mechanisms to strip Orbán’s Hungary of its veto power and its ability to undermine the common European policy on Ukraine. However, nothing prevents the creation of initiatives that legally exist outside the EU framework but are perceived as operating under a European umbrella. NATO's experience proves that this is feasible.  

Why not assign the "coalition of the willing," which is currently taking shape, the same image-building role that the Ramstein format played for NATO? The meetings of this coalition could occasionally take place before EU summits, at the Europa Building in Brussels, just as Ramstein meetings are often held at NATO headquarters.  

In fact, the groundwork for this already exists: EU leadership has participated in all of this coalition’s founding meetings.  

The fact that the "coalition of the willing" extends beyond the EU and includes the UK, Norway, and others is not an obstacle. After all, Ramstein also involves several non-NATO states.

This would address the EU’s key image problems, not only in Ukraine. 

Europe, which is increasingly forced to take responsibility for its own security, would only benefit from the EU assuming ownership of this security issue.  

Moreover, there is no need to limit this approach to just one format. If necessary, it can be applied to other initiatives as well.  

The EU is now preparing for large-scale investments in its own defence capabilities and defence industry. There is little doubt that Ukraine’s participation, given its unique experience and technologies, would strengthen the European Union. Creating a cooperation format that is not constrained by EU procedures, unanimity requirements, and the "special opinions" of individual countries would undoubtedly work in the EU’s favour.  

For Ukrainian society (and not only Ukrainian), this would send yet another signal that Brussels has not become a hostage to the politics conducted by Orbán or Putin. It would show that the EU is ready to act in a rapidly changing world.  

Finally, let’s return to the challenges outlined in the first part of this article. Maintaining the current high level of trust Ukrainians have in the European Union is an issue that requires political investment. If nothing is done, this trust will weaken. The first signs of this trend are already visible, as shown in the graph at the beginning of the article. However, the shift has not yet reached alarming proportions: the number of opponents of Ukraine’s EU accession is not growing, but the number of undecided individuals is increasing significantly.  

Reversing this trend is in the EU’s interest. It needs a pro-European Ukraine.  

And even more so, it is in Ukraine’s own interest. That is why the Ukrainian leadership should support or even initiate such efforts in Brussels.  

Sergiy Sydorenko,  

Editor, European Pravda