Are EU sanctions against Russia effective? And if so, when will their influence be noticeable to the "unaided eye"?

Answers to these questions are not easy to find – the European sanctions policy is one of those topics on which it is very difficult to form an opinion.

And most importantly, next to record sanctions and a decrease in trade with the aggressor, we see an attempt to sit on two chairs. The EU is trying to increase pressure on Russia and at the same time buy energy carriers from there or allow the touring of Russian artists.

So, it is impossible not to recognize the successes of European sanctions – as well as not to see the obvious problems.

And that is why it is worth understanding in more detail what it was like – the EU's sanctions policy in 2024 and what should be changed in 2025.

There are successes, but..

Last year, the European Union adopted three packages of sanctions: in February, June, and December.

In total, 229 people, 165 companies, and 79 tankers of the "shadow" Russian fleet were restricted. Several important prohibitions have also been introduced:

- blocking "Russian SWIFT";

- restrictions on financing European non-governmental organizations from Russia;

- clause "not for Russia" in export supply contracts;

- sanctions against Russian propaganda, including suspending the broadcasting of "RIA Novosti".

Very important steps were the beginning of the sanctioning of tankers, as well as belated, but awareness of the challenges of propaganda and disinformation.

It is also very good that most of the European sanctions in one way or another withstand court scrutiny.

But is this enough?

Aggression is still lasting, the economy of the Russian Federation continues to work, Russia directly interferes in elections in the EU...

So what's wrong with EU sanctions? And what urgently needs to be changed?

Disadvantages of sanctions

Let's try to describe what the sanctions policy of the EU is most criticized for.

1. Liquefied natural gas (LNG): increasing supplies from the Russian Federation.

Europe has given up on Russian pipeline energy carriers – this is a big step. But import of Russian LNG reached a record: 16.5 million tons in 2024, which is more than last year. The share of Russian LNG in maritime gas supplies has increased to 20%.

Such an increase in imports looks like a compromise with our own principles. The goal for 2025 is to ban the import (not transshipment) of LNG.

2. European components and means of production still work for the Russian military-industrial complex.

The Russian military industry continues to use equipment from Europe.

PJSC "ODK - Ufa Motor-Building Production Association" prepares components for military aviation on machines from Germany (manufacturer KNUTH Werkzeugmaschinen, manufactured by Trumpf, manufacturer Walter Maschinenbau, manufactured by Hermle).

JSC "V.V. Bahriev State Research Institute" produces warheads for cruise and ballistic missiles on machines from the Czech Republic (manufacturer TAJMAC-ZPS) and Slovakia (manufacturer TRENS SK).

JSC "Central Scientific Research Institute of Automation and Hydraulics" produces "Iskander-M", X-101 missiles on machines from Switzerland (manufacturer Agie Charmilles (GF Machining Solutions), the second case, the third case).

Swedish SKF cooperates with the Chinese machine tool manufacturer Neway CNC Equipment Suzhou Co. Ltd, which exports its CNC equipment to Russia. 

All these deliveries are still ongoing, even despite the investigation and diplomatic efforts, in particular, by the EU sanctions special envoy.

3. Metals: why not Ukraine?

Russia still exports metals to the EU for billions of euros. In particular, the NLMK group supplies semi-finished products for metallurgy, at the same time providing the Russian military-industrial complex electrical steel.

Europe could replace these supplies with Ukrainian metals, but long transition periods and exceptions allow Russia to stay in the game.

4. Enterprises of Russian oligarchs work for the Russian military industry, and they themselves continue to get rich.

The Eurochem company, founded by oligarch Andriy Melnychenko, supplies chemicals to Sverdlov. The Sverdlov plant in Dzerzhinsk is the main producer of HMX and RDX explosives, which are used in artillery and rockets.

Dmytro Mazepin's company "Uralchem" provided 27,000 tons of ammonium nitrate and 6,000 tons of nitric acid. These materials are used to create explosives such as Amatol. SUMZ (Mid-Ural Copper Smelter), associated with Iskander Makhmudov, supplies oleum to powder factories in Tambov, Kazan, and Perm.

At the same time, the European assets of these sanctioned Russians work quietly, making oligarchs richer and helping Russian aggression.

It turned out to be one of the reasons it's easy to bypass the restrictions, simply reducing its share to less than 50%.

How to increase sanctioning pressure?

What can be changed by the EU shortly? Here are four key tips.

1. Carry out regular updates and additions to the sanctions lists outside the boundaries of large political packages. This will make it possible to react effectively and quickly and pay less attention to the unanimous way of making decisions (or their rejection).
2. Resolutely use international law for the advantage – for example, as countermeasures against the shadow fleet.
3. Create a single sanctions control body in the EU – analog of OFAC in the USA. This will ensure centralized monitoring, control, and unification of sanctions policy at the EU level. Several prominent EU members are already talking about it.
4. Switch from restrictions to a full embargo. Sanctions circumvention has become a large-scale international business that is difficult to completely stop.

Maybe it's time to move from the export restrictions model to the full embargo - some exceptions model.

Only such total economic isolation can become an effective tool against Russia in the long run.

Sanctions should stop being just a demonstration tool to put pressure on Russia's policy, which will not change as long as Putin is alive.

On the contrary, Russia turns everything into a weapon – both tankers that destroy communications and leaders of countries that offer to cede territory.

The sanctions policy is a war that we did not start, but we can – and must – end it. After all, the EU's economy is ten times larger than Russia's.

Publications in the Expert Opinion section are not editorial articles and solely reflect the author's point of view