The world is preparing for the new international reality that will emerge after Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th president of the United States. For Ukraine, which is engaged in an existential war against Russian aggression, the stakes are particularly high. 

But Kyiv views the change of power in the US primarily as an opportunity, while acknowledging the associated challenges. 

What is the basis of this stance? What are Ukraine’s expectations of the Trump administration? Is there room for flexibility, particularly on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations? European Pravda discussed these and other topics with Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs since September 2024. 

This is Sybiha’s first major interview in his new role. We also covered the gas crisis in Transnistria (and Ukraine’s plans), the escalation of tensions with Slovakia, the chance to radically reshape Ukraine’s relationship with Poland, developments in the EU, and events in Georgia, where, following disputed elections, the authorities have appointed a "president" whom Kyiv refuses to recognise. 

"The ban on negotiations with Putin remains in force for Ukraine" 

President Zelenskyy and other leaders have mentioned that things are going to be difficult for Ukraine without US support. What are your expectations of the new US administration?

We view the change of power in the US as a new opportunity and an additional chance. I believe we can expect greater decisiveness from the US. 

We have had initial contact with the new administration, and after 20 January, when there will no longer be legal restrictions on official interactions, we are hopeful that the active phase in our formal relations will begin.

It’s crucial for us that the US should recognise that Ukraine’s security is an integral part of transatlantic security – that we share a common interest. 

We would really like senior representatives of the new US administration to make Ukraine the first country they visit, and we have let our American friends and allies know that. 

During these contacts, we aim to reach a shared assessment and understanding of the importance of achieving a just peace as soon as possible and a recognition of our mutual interests – because a just peace is in the interest of both the American people and the US as a nation. 

Trump's special envoy, Keith Kellogg, will also visit after the inauguration. Is there an agreement that he will come to Kyiv before heading to Moscow?

That hasn’t been agreed. We haven’t discussed that. 

President Trump plans to join the talks on the comprehensive peace agreement in person. Is it still our position that these talks should take place in Kyiv? If not, then where?

We are obviously very interested in the president’s visit. 

But the main thing is not the venue, but the outcome. It’s crucial that a meeting between President Zelenskyy and President Trump take place. This is really very important. After that, we can determine the next steps towards achieving the goal we share with the US – a just peace. 

Previously Ukraine had a ban on negotiations with Putin, imposed by the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC).

Yes, that decision remains in effect. 

Does that mean our position is firm that we will not engage in negotiations with him?

As of today, the NSDC decision is still valid. 

What is Ukraine’s position on NATO membership? When the comprehensive peace agreement is discussed, the question of alternative formats will inevitably be raised.

Our position is clear and firm: NATO membership is the only effective security guarantee for Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine's membership guarantees NATO's security.

On top of that, Ukraine's full membership is, if you’ll pardon my cynicism, the cheapest way for NATO to safeguard European security.

I’d also like to remind you that Ukraine’s goal of joining NATO is enshrined in our Constitution, and, equally importantly, it has public support – an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians back NATO membership. 

We’ve already gone through "alternative options". We’ve seen how the Budapest Memorandum failed. The creation of any "grey areas" only leads to further escalation. 

That is why Ukraine's NATO membership is an unchanging priority and the only effective guarantee of security for our country.

Can bilateral guarantees serve as a temporary substitute for membership?

Other security guarantees can serve as a tool to prepare Ukraine for membership and strengthen it along the way. But there can be no substitute for NATO membership.

"The new EU budget from 2028 should factor in Ukraine’s and Moldova’s membership"

Let’s return to Europe and talk about gas. The Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, is demanding the resumption of gas transit. Could the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine resume, and under what conditions?

Gas transit ended on 1 January, and Ukraine has repeatedly communicated this at the highest levels. There are no plans to resume it, and this stance remains unchanged. 

At the same time, Ukraine needs a good relationship with Slovakia – a member of both NATO and the EU. How can that be achieved?

Our interaction isn’t limited to the gas issue alone. 

But Fico is framing it exclusively around gas.

I’m talking about Slovakia’s strategic interests. We are neighbours. We are bound by geography to maintain good neighbourly relations. 

It’s no secret that Russia uses energy as a weapon. Dependence on Russian gas never ends well. The price Russia imposes is many times higher and sometimes involves a loss of sovereignty. Decisions that seem painful today will ultimately prove beneficial. 

We are honest about this. That’s what good neighbourly relations are for – to call things by their names. 

Incidentally, Austria, which also faced challenges due to the gas cuts, found alternative suppliers and is no longer reliant on Russian gas. 

We’re going to need Slovakia’s support this year to open chapters in the EU accession negotiations. How will we secure that?

Let’s trust our diplomats and give them the chance to prove their effectiveness. 

However, I must emphasise that Ukraine’s path to the EU cannot be made contingent on misunderstandings. We will respond firmly if anyone tries to exploit such issues. That is unacceptable – not only from Slovakia, but from any EU member state. 

No country should abuse its status as an EU or NATO member by tying strategic decisions to temporary disagreements which we will eventually overcome. 

In some EU countries, Ukraine has become a tool in domestic political battles, such as in Poland. 

With Poland, our closest ally and friend, we are making strides towards resolving these issues. We have recently made significant progress on matters of historical memory. 

Ukraine’s words match its actions. I am confident that it will be the same with Poland. Depoliticising historical memory issues is in both our interests. We and our Polish friends have set up a working group composed of respected historians from both sides and agreed on a list of memorial sites of mutual interest. 

We demand proper recognition of Ukrainian memory in Poland, and the list includes Monastyr Hill [near Werchrata close to the Ukrainian border, site of the grave of 62 Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) soldiers, two 1940s stone crosses with tridents, and a monument – ed.]. Let’s wait and see what Poland decides on this matter. 

Some politicians in Poland continue to stoke anti-Ukrainian sentiment. We’ve heard remarks from the defence minister, among others, that Ukraine views as unfriendly.

Indeed, some are actually provocative. 

We respond to all such remarks very openly and urge our partners not to exploit sensitive issues for political gain, especially now, when we have made progress. 

In a democracy, you can’t force politicians to stop making statements, but you can minimise their impact. We need to deprive this kind of rhetoric of its foundation and render it empty. Ukraine and Poland must work together on the issues that, although painful for our societies, need to be resolved. And we’re on the right track. 

There are also trade-related tensions with Poland. Border blockades are a possibility.

We aren’t the first country to face challenges on the path to EU membership. Other countries' experiences show that negotiations with certain EU member states can be tough, but history proves that this path is navigable. 

Our goal is to navigate it with minimal damage to bilateral relations, and with a shared understanding of how crucial Ukraine’s formal return to the European community is. 

Let me stress: I say "formal return" because we are already a de facto European country. There is no doubt that we will join the EU. Our European partners must factor this into the seven-year EU budget for 2028-2034. The upcoming budget process, which begins in a month’s time, should be framed as an enlargement budget, reflecting Ukraine’s future accession and recognising Ukraine as an EU member state. 

This applies to Moldova as well. 

Poland, in particular, understands that Ukraine will join the EU. They remain one of the strongest advocates for Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership. There is a difference between public rhetoric and actual actions. 

Look at the growth in bilateral trade [Poland was Ukraine’s second-largest import partner after China in 2024 and the top export partner – EP]. This is a genuine indicator of mutual interest. 

I anticipate that we will finally conclude the agreement on joint or coordinated customs control at our border crossings (we are very close to this) and begin expanding the border infrastructure – currently the bottleneck in our trade relations.

"The transit of Russian gas for Transnistria is unacceptable"

You mentioned Moldova. Do you expect Ukraine and Moldova to join the EU simultaneously?

We made the decisions on candidate status and on the start of negotiations together. We are coordinating with Moldova and are travelling this road together.

I believe that it is in our national interest to achieve this goal together, to become part of the European Union.

Does the Ukrainian government understand that Russia has created an artificial gas crisis in Transnistria to undermine this process?

Absolutely. Russia is not only orchestrating a humanitarian crisis in the Transnistrian region – it is also trying to manipulate Moldovan public sentiment ahead of the parliamentary elections. This is evident. 

For Russia, gas is one of the tools it can use to influence elections in Moldova. 

Do we have a plan to counter this?

We’ve reached out to our Moldovan friends. President Zelenskyy spoke with Maia Sandu, and we asked a simple question: "How can we help?" We are also coordinating this assistance with the EU. 

As you may know, some of Moldova’s gas reserves are stored in our underground storage facilities. We are ready to continue filling these storage facilities for Moldova’s needs if our partners are willing. 

We’ve also looked at the option of supplying coal to the Transnistrian region. And we’re exploring ideas to improve the efficiency of thermal power plants. We are awaiting Moldova’s response. 

The Trans-Balkan gas pipeline runs through Ukraine and could potentially be used by Russia to supply gas to Transnistria. Will Ukraine allow it to be used for Russian gas transit?

This needs to be looked into, but my stance is clear: Russian gas transit is entirely unacceptable. 

At present, we’re focusing on how Ukraine and the EU can jointly assist the Transnistrian region without involving Russian gas. That’s what’s on the agenda. Let’s concentrate on solutions that exclude Russian involvement. 

What is Ukraine’s position on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict?

Moldova’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, including over the Transnistrian region, must be restored. 

Is there any possibility of the 5+2 format being revived for this purpose?

No, the 5+2 format became ineffective after Russia's aggression began. 

It needs to be relaunched in a way that excludes Russia. Any format involving Russia is unacceptable to us. 

Instead, it's likely that the European Union will play a larger role in resolving the Transnistrian issue.

"I don’t believe in a government built against the people’s will" 

To conclude, let’s discuss the Caucasus, particularly Georgia. Who is the president of Georgia?

Ukraine supports the Georgian people. We condemn the decision to suspend European integration, we condemn the numerous violations committed during the parliamentary elections, and we condemn the Georgian government’s disproportionate repression of its citizens.

Therefore, our response to the actions of the Georgian authorities was firm:

we imposed sanctions on individuals suspected of human rights violations against Georgian citizens. 

In its report on Georgia, the OSCE mission has recommended that new elections should be held. 

To answer your question, Ukraine recognises states [not individual leaders – EP].

In Georgia, Mikheil Kavelashvili claims to be the president. Does Ukraine engage with him in any way?

We support the Georgian people. Promoting democratic values, protecting human rights and adhering to international standards are not just empty words for us, as a country that has undergone its own revolutions. 

I don’t believe in successful governments or models of power that are built against the will of the people. 

We are also convinced that the Georgian people have chosen a Euro-Atlantic future. 

In Belarus, Ukraine’s neighbour, there is a similar individual who claims to be the president – Alexander Lukashenko.

The so-called president. 

Exactly, the so-called president. In official statements by the [Ukrainian] foreign ministry, the word "president" is never used next to his name. Can we expect to see a similar approach towards Georgia?

I assure you, we read European Pravda’s article on this issue very carefully. 

I can only add that our approach will be aligned with that of the European Union. As a country aspiring to full EU membership, we are obliged to adhere to the political assessments and statements of the European Union.

Sergiy Sydorenko

Editor, European Pravda

Translated by Daria Meshcheriakova