Czech President Petr Pavel is a military officer by profession. A retired general, he was once the highest-serving representative of a Central European country in NATO, as chairman of the Alliance’s Military Committee. 

His direct and often uncompromising statements about Ukraine have repeatedly sparked controversy and have certainly gone against the mainstream. This was particularly evident in 2023-2024, when he suggested that Ukraine should prepare for compromises with Russia. 

At the same time, Petr Pavel is a staunch supporter of military aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It was he who publicly pushed forward the Czech ammunition initiative, which has provided Ukraine with hundreds of thousands of large-calibre shells from all over the world. Now, despite opposition from many Czech government officials, he advocates for Czechia’s participation in a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine as part of the security guarantees. 

"I know that it sounds like a cliché, but I truly believe that we are doing it to a large extent for ourselves," he says of Czech assistance. 

European Pravda spoke briefly with Pavel in Kyiv before his two-day visit to Ukraine came to an end.

"The war will most probably end up with some compromise"

Mr President, do you really believe that EU and NATO member states also face the threat of war with Russia?

Of course I do.

In fact, being most of my professional life in the military, I was pretty sure where the risks for Europe and for democracies come from.

Within the last, let's say, 20 years, the biggest threat to European security was and still is Russia.

I think it is quite clear that without significant change in Russian leadership and the Russian approach to international politics, Russia will continue to be a threat to European democracies.

It's good that you know that, but do other European politicians and ordinary Europeans understand the reality of this threat?

I would argue that most European politicians and quite a large part of the population are aware of the Russian threat.

Of course, the closer to Russia a country is, the more imminent they see the threat. Quite naturally, people living in Portugal, for example, would perceive the Russian threat differently than Estonia.

But in general, it is obvious to everyone that there is no bigger single threat in Europe than Russia.

You were among the first politicians in Europe [back in early 2023] to say that Ukraine should prepare not for victory but for concessions, that regaining full control over its borders would not be possible. At the time, many refused to accept this. Now this has become the most likely scenario. Did you anticipate this outcome? 

It was quite obvious that if Western countries were not able, for good reasons, to come up to assist Ukraine by combat forces – because that would really mean a war between NATO and Russia – it was only on material support. And the material support was not big enough to allow Ukraine a swift victory in this war.

Ukraine was only relying on its own human resources, which are limited and, of course, much smaller than Russian human resources are.

That led me to the conclusion that if there is no real will to provide much more military support, and with limited personnel, it will be impossible for Ukraine, without huge losses, to succeed in liberating territories that are occupied by Russia.

And that's why my quite realistic assessment was that this conflict, without changing the parameters, will most probably end up with some compromise.

Now we are heading towards such a compromise,

but I believe that the compromise solution shouldn't be recognition of occupied territories as rightfully Russian, but as a reality on the ground that part of the territory of Ukraine is and will for some time be temporarily occupied by Russia.

"The aggressor should not be rewarded"

Was there a realistic chance of avoiding this? If the US had provided more support more quickly, or if Trump had pursued a different policy on Russia, would Ukraine have had a chance of winning?

Even before Ukraine started its big counteroffensive two years ago, it was not well equipped to really succeed, because for a successful offensive, military theory says that you need a ratio of at least three, or preferably five, to one.

At that time, the force ratio between Ukraine and Russia was still in favour of Russia.

So it was quite obvious that a counteroffensive would not be as successful to liberate all the territories.

We are where we are now. I think what we need to do is maintain support for Ukraine to an extent that it is able to maintain the territory, not to lose any more, and create conditions very soon for a ceasefire and subsequent peace.

You say that Ukraine should not recognise that we have lost territories. They will remain Ukrainian legally. But do you see a real chance of reclaiming Crimea, Donbas, and other occupied regions?

Well, if you look around the globe, there are a number of territories that are occupied by another country and are not legally recognised as their own.

It may take some time, but I believe that as a matter of principle,

if we want to maintain the rules-based international order, where principles like territorial integrity and sovereignty matter, then we simply cannot accept the fact that the aggressor will be rewarded by being granted legal ownership of occupied territories.

That's why we don't have any other option than not to recognise it and declare it at maximum as temporarily occupied.

But of course, the extent of "temporary" will be a question.

Unfortunately the world is changing. We see the actions of the United States... Are you certain they will not recognise the occupied Ukrainian territories as Russian? 

It's very difficult to judge what the approach of the United States will be, because we have seen so many unexpected moves that it's more and more difficult.

But I still believe that the United States doesn't want to abandon the rules-based international order, because it protects us all, including the United States.

"Let's not take NATO off the table"

Peace must include security guarantees that make another attack impossible. What should these guarantees look like?

I see guarantees for Ukraine as basically twofold.

One will be an agreement with the United States. We can call it, briefly, a mineral agreement. But the very...

…Do you believe these guarantees are truly reliable?

Well, in practical terms, if there is an American presence – not military, but a business presence and business interests present in Ukraine – you can expect that these interests will be protected.

Another part of guarantees will come from European countries – countries that have declared their willingness to support Ukraine.

And now we talk mostly about the newly organised coalition of the willing – countries that are able and willing to deploy some stabilising force to Ukraine once a peace agreement is achieved.

And do you see Czechia as part of it?

We are part of this coalition now, and I believe that once we come to an understanding that there is a common will to deploy forces, that Czechia will be part of it.

Do you mean peacekeepers from Czechia? There have been some sceptical voices from Prague about sending a contingent…

Different politicians may have different views, but if there is a strong group of European nations willing to provide a security guarantee to Ukraine, my strong conviction is that Czechia should be among them.

And I know that it sounds like a cliché, but I truly believe that we are doing it to a large extent for ourselves.

You didn’t mention NATO, even though you know it would be the most cost-effective security guarantee. Why? Do you think Ukraine realistically cannot count on it?

We have seen the American president discarding the option of early membership of Ukraine in NATO.

If it is to be an obstacle in achieving a peace agreement, let it be, because NATO membership is not an issue for a couple of months. It will need a longer time.

But my recommendation would be: let's not put it off the table.

Let's have it as an open issue for the future, because politicians come and go, and the administration will be different in three years, so we may see a different view with the new administration.

In the meantime, we will all work with Ukraine on reconstruction, on more interoperability. We will exchange experience from this conflict. We will build new Ukrainian capabilities.

All these steps will bring Ukraine closer to European partners, who eventually may become allies.

I wouldn’t even rule out the emergence of a new, so to speak, European NATO. Given how the US has acted, it's possible they will abandon Europe.

I do think that it is in the interest of the United States to have a strong ally in Europe.

Because if the United States sees China as a main systemic rival, it will always be better for them to have Europe by their side than left behind.

We will always work on the assumption that together we are stronger, and it will be valid even in the future.

Sergiy Sydorenko,

Editor, European Pravda