Ukraine has failed to achieve its maximum plan at the NATO summit in Vilnius – a political invitation to join NATO that would open the doors for the accession process after the war.

It was specifically about a political invitation, not a formal invitation to begin the accession process, as in the case of Sweden or Finland.

However, Ukraine has successfully achieved the minimum plan, as mentioned in the article by Aliona Hetmanchuk, Director of the Center for New Europe, "Minimum Programme in Vilnius: What Ukraine Gained from the NATO Summit and What Needs to Be Done Next."

The minimum plan was to achieve "Bucharest Plus" in terms of the formulations regarding membership in the Alliance and "Budapest Plus" in terms of security commitments.

Paradoxically, the changes that have occurred in the perception of Ukraine's future membership in NATO among Western decision-makers are much deeper than what has been reflected on paper in the summit's final communiqué.

Today, the probability of Ukraine joining the Alliance no longer faces resistance even from the biggest skeptics.

The question is how and when exactly. And here, significant divergences remain between us and our NATO partners in terms of perception.

In the Alliance, it is believed that during the active counteroffensive phase, two tracks regarding Ukraine should be clearly separated: support in the war and integration into NATO. If any connection between these tracks is seen in the key capitals of the Alliance, it is seen as a threat to escalation in the war.

In Kyiv, on the contrary, these two tracks are seen as interconnected – Ukraine's invitation to NATO and, moreover, the actual accession process could contribute to the resolution of the ongoing war, not just as insurance against new aggressions. In other words, it could lead to de-escalation.

Increasingly, there are discussions, including with American interlocutors, about the potential application of the West/East Germany model in Ukraine: when NATO would be ready to accept Ukraine even before it fully restores its territorial integrity, including Crimea.

Obviously, in exchange for a step-by-step scenario, Ukraine, like West Germany once did, would have to take on certain obligations, such as a commitment not to liberate Crimea by military means.

Secondly, in Kyiv, invitations and accession to NATO were clearly differentiated, based on the logic that the invitation could be extended during the war, while the actual accession would take place later. In NATO, on the other hand, they insist that the invitation and the beginning of the accession process are one stage.

Everyone involved in the decision on Ukraine's invitation, both in the country and beyond, understood that what couldn't be achieved in Vilnius would need to be further worked on in Washington.

Any campaign requires time. Just two months ago, any formulation with the words "invitation" or "invite" caused such overt irritation in certain capitals that it was safer not to mention it even behind closed doors.

Moreover, there was resistance to even discussing Ukraine's future membership in Vilnius, as if this topic didn't exist in principle. Ukraine imposed its agenda, understanding that if we want to bring specific decisions to Washington, we must start working on them now.

It turned out to be honest, although not very pleasant – we imposed our agenda on them, and they imposed their declaration on us.

Now, let's move on to "Budapest Plus" – specifically, the declaration regarding security support for Ukraine, approved in Vilnius within the framework of the G7.

Let's reiterate: these are not security guarantees; they are guarantees of security support.

We simply agreed with the NATO member countries to call them "security commitments."

If we carefully examine the content of the declaration, essentially, it is a written affirmation of the formula "to support Ukraine as long as it takes" – both militarily and financially. At least until Ukraine's NATO accession.