How has the West's attitude towards Ukraine changed after the NATO summit in July? Can we call the Western expert and public attitude "pro-Ukrainian"?

Editor of European Pravda Sergiy Sydorenko discussed this and more with Maria Zolkina, a researcher at the London School of Economics and the Ukrainian Foundation "Democratic Initiatives" and a long-time author for European Pravda. Her experience in countering Russian ideas and propaganda during the war in Donbas proves valuable even during the full-scale aggression.

The main points are covered in the article The world loves winners. What Western partners expect from the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Paradoxically, they want to see us in NATO, but at the same time, they are afraid of it.

The reasons for this lie in the unchanged attitude towards Russia and the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war.

NATO member states claim that they do not understand when and how the war will end, so they are not ready to make decisions. However, this is a fundamental mistake. They should not wait but rather formulate a position on ending the war. A formal invitation to Ukraine for membership (which does not even mean the start of accession) would be a crucial political signal that shapes a clear position: Ukraine will be in the Alliance.

Unfortunately, some countries still hesitate about Ukraine's accession.

One of those hesitant is the United States, a key power in the Alliance. Germany is also uncertain.

The mainstream expert opinion on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war and Ukraine's future differs significantly from country to country.

There are several reasons for such striking differences in the expert discourse in different countries.

Firstly, in the past, when Moscow was not toxic, it had a total influence on experts in certain countries. They were invited to Russia, fostered psychological loyalty and a positive attitude towards it, and remnants of this influence persist to this day.

Another partially related reason is that current experts in pro-Ukrainian countries were yesterday's diplomats, officials, or other specialists engaged in researching Russia and its relations. The mainstream was focused on Russia's economic engagement, attempts to promote democracy there, and even integrating Russia into the European security system. Now, life has shown that all these ideas were wrong.

However, it is challenging for many experts to admit that they were wrong.

We need to explain and prove a lot at the expert level. Crucially, we need to use exclusively rational arguments as emotional appeals no longer work.

Only in this way can we persuade or neutralise the influence of those Western experts who promote non-functional scenarios for resolving the conflict.

We are currently at a critical moment, linked precisely to the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Expert assessments in the West have now "paused" to understand the developments on the battlefield.

In the autumn, depending on this, a new Western collective position will form, a new mainstream. It is not excluded that the scales will tilt towards negotiations.

Thus, in reality, plans and assessments will be tied to changes on the battlefield.

If the Ukrainian Armed Forces reach Melitopol, break through the Russian defence line, and divide them into two camps, it will be an indicator of the success of the counteroffensive. It will immediately influence the opinions of experts and the political decision on further support for Ukraine.

Achieving consensus on inviting Ukraine to NATO in 2024 will be much easier.

The winning formula for pro-Ukrainian experts in the West is undoubtedly the liberation of Ukrainian territory and its NATO membership.