The issue of designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism is frequently discussed in expert and political circles.

While these propositions are often mentioned in the context of the United States, the most practical effect of designating Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism could be achieved within the framework of the Council of Europe.

More details can be found in the article by lawyer Markiian Bem: Punishment for a State Sponsor of Terrorism: How Council of Europe Can Facilitate Confiscation of Russian Assets.

After Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe, it remains one of the most significant international organisations countering Russia. The Council of Europe has repeatedly supported international legal steps and initiatives by Ukraine. In May 2023, within the Council of Europe, the Agreement on the Establishment of a Damage Registry for Ukraine was concluded.

It is expected that the Council of Europe will serve as a platform for the functioning of an international compensation mechanism for Ukraine.

However, the organisation's potential is much greater, including its numerous international treaties concluded and functioning within its framework.

One of these is the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw Convention or CETS 198), signed in Warsaw in May 2005.

One of the matters regulated by this Convention is countering the financing of terrorism.

If one of the participating states initiates a criminal case related to terrorism, it can request other states to freeze or arrest property used to finance it.

Ukraine, also a party to the Warsaw Convention, practically since the start of the full-scale Russian aggression, has designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and consistently insists on such an interpretation. In this case, if the actions of the Russian government during the war in Ukraine are classified as acts of terrorism, then the actions of individuals financially supporting the Russian regime can be classified as financing terrorism.

Parties to the Warsaw Convention are obligated to take necessary measures for the arrest and confiscation of property used or intended for financing terrorism, or income obtained from this crime.

However, the 2005 Convention contains significant exceptions to the obligation of a state to apply asset confiscation to individuals involved in financing terrorism.

For Ukraine, there are two most risky reasons.

The first is the contradiction to property protection principles – key European states effectively refer to the impossibility of confiscating Russian assets. The second involves possible harm to national interests – Hungary might do the same, arguing potential countermeasures from Russia.

And most importantly, the application of the asset confiscation mechanism under the 2005 Convention is possible only if other states also classify Russia's actions as acts of terrorism.

Unfortunately, as of today, only a few entities have designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism or state supporting terrorism.

The mechanism within the framework of the Warsaw Convention is just one of many that Ukraine can use to repatriate Russian assets. However, as evident, it is not straightforward, accessible, or universal.

Nonetheless, in any case, Russia obtaining the status of a state sponsor of terrorism could have not only moral-political effects but also practical consequences for compensating Ukraine's losses through Russian assets. But this will not happen on just like that. It requires diligent diplomatic and political efforts by Ukraine and its partner countries.