How Russia Uses War in Nagorno-Karabakh

On 19 September, Azerbaijan initiated a new war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Whether it will lead to Baku's final control over the region and whether it will turn Armenia definitively westward is the subject of the article by EuroPravda editor Yurii Panchenko, "Third Karabakh." Why did this new war start in the Caucasus and its potential consequences.

The new war in Karabakh was expected immediately after the signing of a trilateral ceasefire statement by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia in 2020.

Following the results of the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Azerbaijan managed to regain control over all territories captured by Armenia around Karabakh and parts of Nagorno-Karabakh itself.

However, the ceasefire agreement did not stop the hostilities. They simply transitioned into a low-intensity mode.

Military clashes began the following year, with most of them occurring not in Karabakh itself but on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.

At the end of last year, Azerbaijan successfully took military control of the Lachin Gap. Russian "peacekeepers" were either unable or unwilling to prevent it. The blockade of Karabakh lasted for over nine months and led to another significant victory for Baku, as the Karabakh "authority" agreed to receive humanitarian supplies through transport routes fully controlled by Baku.

Another victory for Baku was Armenia's recognition of Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, as part of a peaceful dialogue mediated by the EU and the US.

However, the question of security guarantees for the Armenian population in Karabakh is a significant obstacle to reaching a peace agreement. Baku considers them its citizens and claims to be able to resolve all issues with them independently, while Yerevan insists that international mediation is necessary.

Why did the new war start now? The most likely explanation is linked to a leadership change in the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

On 9 September, the self-proclaimed republic got a new "president," Samvel Shahramanyan, described as a Kremlin puppet. Significantly, he immediately began making statements about the republic's independent status, contradicting the recent agreements between Baku and Yerevan.

These changes significantly increased the likelihood of a new war, which indeed began on September 19.

Azerbaijan's military advantage is sufficient to take control of Karabakh with minimal losses, especially given that the Armenian authorities claim not to interfere in this conflict.

However, Baku understands well that gaining full control over Karabakh will inevitably lead to civilian casualties, which significantly increases the chances of Western intervention.

In this situation, Baku alternates between military actions and peace proposals.

Towards the end of 19 September, signs of Baku's position softening emerged. The Azerbaijani president's administration invited "representatives of Armenians living in the Karabakh region" to discuss reintegration, without preconditions.

What about the Russian "peacekeepers"? They had previously avoided fulfilling their duties – protecting the civilian population. However, Russian non-interference is now especially noticeable.

Armenian media report that the Russians knew about the start in advance. Furthermore, they claim that the Russians provided coordinates of Armenian military objects to Azerbaijan in advance and then relocated themselves as far away from them as possible.

So, what's behind Russia's current actions: weakness or its own interests, which diverge from the interests of its ally Armenia? The latter seems quite probable. The current war in the South Caucasus allows Russia to achieve at least two goals: to punish Pashinyan for his shift to the West and to facilitate the transit of "sanctions."

Let alone another war could divert Western attention from the situation in Ukraine.

At the same time, it may pave the way for Armenia's real turn toward the West.