Georgia lost the war for Abkhazia 30 years ago.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has been frozen for three decades. Since 2008, it has resembled eternal stasis. There are currently no conditions for sudden and unexpected changes in the situation in the region.

In Georgia, there is now a consensus: returning occupied territories must be peaceful.

However, after Azerbaijan quickly regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh, questions about the future of Abkhazia and all the "republics" created in the 1990s on the post-Soviet territory began to arise more often.

South Caucasus expert Natalia Ishchenko discusses how Gerorgia can regain its territories Three scenarios for returning Abkhazia: How Georgia can restore territorial integrity.

Despite another occupied territory, the Tskhinvali region or South Ossetia, this article will specifically focus on Abkhazia.

So, the first option for the reintegration of Russia-occupied Georgian territories is very much liked by the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Georgian President Salome Zourabishvili, and, apparently, the Georgian opposition.

It can be formulated as follows: when Ukraine wins the war, Georgia will easily regain control of the autonomous regions.

Arguments in favour of this scenario: the current existence of Abkhazia depends on Russian subsidies. They still make up more than half of the "republic's" budget. Therefore, Russia's defeat in the war against Ukraine should stop Kremlin funding of separatist regimes.

As hoped in Tbilisi, this will open a window of opportunity for reintegration.

To implement this plan, Russia's defeat must be total.

The second option is a military scenario for Georgia's reintegration, so to speak, the Karabakh option.

Such an option is possible mainly theoretically. However, for this, Georgia must become a powerful state with a developed economy and a strong army, backed by the support of an influential regional leader (presumably Türkiye).

Under the current Georgian government, and due to the culture of pacifism in the country's politics and daily life, such an option is unrealistic.

There is also a third option, which is not often discussed in expert circles but seems to best match the current situation in Georgia.

This probable plan is based, once again, on Georgia's desire to restore territorial integrity without force. Unlike the first option, it does not rely on the expectation of Russia's defeat.

Tbilisi may be waiting for nothing more than the weakening of Russia's financial capabilities under sanctions pressure and increased military expenses, making it a luxury. Moscow then cannot afford to maintain puppet states.

The Georgian authorities may hope to take advantage of the situation and regain the occupied territories, without fighting Russia, but with its support.

Perhaps the "Georgian dreamers" believe that Russia will eventually see that it is more beneficial to stake everything on a loyal Georgia in the region.

Of course, this plan excludes guarantees of preserving Georgian independence in the full sense and may include Georgia's accession to some old-new interstate union with Russia at its helm.

It's about the "Belarusian scenario."

The recent statements by Georgian law enforcement officials about the "preparation of a Euromaidan in Georgia" with the participation of Ukraine may be seen as part of a plan to "Belarusianise" Georgians.

This third option for the reintegration of occupied territories seems incredible and is something that Georgian society will never accept.