In recent weeks, representatives of the Ukrainian authorities, including the President, regularly talk about the prospects of confiscating Russian assets and urge allies to make such decisions.

Apparently, the confiscation of Russian assets (it mainly refers to $300 billion in reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation) is becoming the main political goal/hope/plan for 2024 in the confrontation with Russia

The applicable legal mechanisms, namely countermeasures in conformity with international law, are more or less obvious: the idea of their application became the basis for the REPO (Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act) American draft law on the confiscation of assets of the Russian Federation, and they are proposed to be applied by a group of prominent international lawyers headed by Dapo Akande and Philippe Sands, in a currently non-public memorandum.

Read more in the article by Ivan Horodyskyy, Director of the Dnistrianskyi Center – Challenges of Confiscation: What Will Help Ukraine Achieve Transfer of Russian Assets.

The first problem is the leadership in the confiscation process. While in Brussels they expect this from the USA, the US representatives point to the EU as the largest managers of frozen Russian assets.

The reason for this is common – everyone is afraid of aftershocks for their currencies and economies as a result of this decision.

Political uncertainty leads to apprehension about decision-making and may result in its delay.

Secondly, it is worth keeping in mind the political context of the 2024 election year.

In the US Congress, they are afraid to pass the REPO bill, which may potentially give additional powers to Donald Trump. The European Union also faces difficult elections to the European Parliament, the presidency of Hungary in the EU and, potentially, Orbán's presidency over the European Council.

And the third problem is that the basic scenario for compensation to Ukraine is not confiscation, but voluntary payment of reparations by the Russian Federation.

Although we all understand that such a prospect is unrealistic, it means that the decision on confiscation will most likely be made by our allies only after the Russian Federation finally refuses voluntary compensation. And this refusal must be recorded in the course of the political settlement, whenever and in what format it begins.

However, even the political decision itself – no matter when and how it is made – may not be enough.

In addition to the political decision on confiscation of assets, the next stage is also critical: enforcement of the decision on confiscation. It will not be automatic and quick, even if a decision is made.

And this can be traced on the example of already announced assets that were to be transferred to Ukraine.

In the case of the Russian asset confiscation and subsequent use for compensation to Ukraine, it is worth considering a plan that provides a real understanding of what to do and what to expect.

If an attempt is made to draft such a manifesto for confiscating Russian assets, it should first declare and justify the inevitability of the confiscation of frozen Russian assets and build a strategy where decisions on this are final.

 In this context, it is also important to clearly define the goals of such confiscation.

And it is important to focus not only on the decision to confiscate assets but also on the plan of further actions and steps regarding their use and transfer to Ukraine.

In this process, it is important to continue work on the elaboration of an international compensation mechanism, within which compensation for damages from aggression will be carried out and which can become an institutional platform for the use of confiscated assets.

The process of confiscating Russian assets will be difficult, challenging, and lengthy.

Although inevitably successful.