Should Ukraine be concerned about provocations from Transnistria?

The closer 28 February is (the day set for a general congress of local "MPs" in occupied Transnistria), the more acute is the question of what the Kremlin is going to perfom there.

Moldovan MP Oazu Nantoi is one of the few Moldovan lawmakers who is well-aware in Transnistrian affairs and understands the Russian tactics.

Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor, spoke with him in Kyiv, which Nantoi visited for the second anniversary of Russia's invasion.

Nantoi does not rule out Moscow's recognition of Transnistria's "independence."

Read more about the possible consequences of the recognition, why Chisinau is still calm, and what the position of the Ukrainian community in Moldova is in the interview – Threat of Transnistria, Putin's plan, and pro-Russian Ukrainians in Moldova.

The situation is alarming, although personally I treat it with humor, as this is not the first time.

Transnistria constantly repeats that they are a Russian outpost. There have been about six referenda called "Putin, take us" [the last and key "referendum," which "established" that Transnistria should join the Russian Federation, took place in 2006. – ed.].

But Russia has not recognised the "independence" of Transnistria. The point is that Putin needs not this narrow strip of land, but the entire Republic of Moldova, influenced through Transnistria all these years.

And we enter 28 February with such a basis when in Tiraspol, the so-called "congress of all MPs" will take place. It plans to appeal to Putin. This is a performance and a political provocation organised at the Kremlin's request. The goal is to play into the hands of the Kremlin fuhrer.

What the Kremlin will do after is hard to say.

It cannot be ruled out that Russia will recognise the so-called "independence of Transnistria" to escalate the situation.

If the Russian Federation recognises the "independence of Transnistria," I do not expect any apocalyptic scenario.

After all, Moldova does not share a common border with Russia. The front line is far from Moldova.

On the contrary, such a step by the Kremlin may prompt both Kyiv and Chisinau to take more specific, but peaceful steps towards the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova.

So that people on the left bank of the Dniester realise that Russia is far away.

And, by the way, the authorities on the left bank of the Dniester are well aware of their vulnerability. The fact that the Kremlin may resort to escalation is not in their business interests.

Nothing will change in military terms, as the armed units on the left bank do not have significant military potential. So even if they start any actions against Ukraine, they won't last long.

Theoretically though, in the apocalyptic scenario when something happens on the front line, the Joint Control Commission and the "Transnistrian army" may play some role.

So everything depends on the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the front.

Russia's attempts to destabilise Moldova are not limited to Transnistria.

There are grounds to expect problems in the Gagauz autonomy in southern Moldova.

But Russia's main goal is the presidential elections in Moldova in late 2024. Russia has not yet chosen its candidate.

More realistically, the provocation in the form of the Transnistrian "congress" is related to the internal politics of Moldova, where presidential elections are scheduled for 2024 and a referendum on citizens' attitudes towards Moldova's EU accession.