Most Western countries are afraid of setting a precedent by confiscating frozen Russian assets in favour of Ukraine and are only willing to transfer their profits to Kyiv.

British Foreign Minister David Cameron, however, proposes a solution to this dilemma that is both extravagant and more acceptable to Western countries.

Essentially, the Russian frozen state assets are proposed to be "forcibly lent" to Ukraine. These funds, which Russian authorities (presumably the new ones) would be able to reclaim after paying all compensations to Kyiv.

Read more about what changes such a plan brings for Ukraine and whether it is likely to be implemented in the article by Ivan Horodysky, director of the Dnistrianskyi Center- Forced loan: What's behind UK's new initiative on confiscating Russian assets.

Ten leading international law experts have co-signed an open letter to the Group of Seven states, stating that it would be lawful to use Russian state assets as compensation for the damage that has resulted directly from Russia's unlawful conduct.

However, as justified as such a decision may be from a legal standpoint, its adoption depends on the collective political will of the states controlling Russian assets. And such political will, primarily from EU member states, is not yet apparent.

In the era of globalisation, the principle of sovereign immunity has gained broader significance than excluding the property of one state from the jurisdiction of another, serving as a guarantee of stability and predictability in the international economy.

And undermining this system of guarantees can have far-reaching consequences.

This is precisely what economists and central banks fear.

At the beginning of the year, Reuters experts proposed a new approach to using frozen Russian assets – issuing so-called reparation bonds. These bonds could be secured by future reparations from Russia and serve as an alternative to the direct confiscation of the Russian Central Bank's reserves.

This proposal might have remained at the level of expert discussion, but it found an unexpected supporter – British Foreign Minister David Cameron.

The main legal advantage of the "reparation bonds" plan is that, according to it, sovereign Russian assets would be confiscated only if Russia refuses to pay reparations to Ukraine. And interest payments could also roll up and only become payable if Kyiv gets compensation.

This also allows avoiding the risks of undermining trust in the dollar and the euro as reserve currencies – a risk mentioned by representatives of the European Central Bank.

This plan is not flawless. It can be expected that the bond interest rates will be high due to uncertainty about whether Russia will pay reparations and whether the confiscation of these assets will be legitimate. These risks are likely to force Ukraine to offer a significant discount to investors in the bonds: selling them below face value while still repaying them in full, along with interest.

All this makes the issuance of these bonds more expensive for Ukraine and raises doubts about the financial benefit of such a plan for it. It does not make it impossible though.

The diversity of different plans regarding the handling of Russian assets (for example, the issuance of "reparation bonds") is evidence of a lack of common vision.

And this, in turn, means that the process of confiscating and using Russian assets will be prolonged.

It is more likely that this year, only a decision will be made to use the income from the Russian Central Bank assets in the interests of Ukraine. This is also recognised as the most realistic scenario by the Ukrainian government.