On 2 March, the European Commission put forward proposals for draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. The text turned out to be almost identical to the frameworks for two Balkan candidates – Albania and North Macedonia, with a slight difference in its provisions.

European Pravda has analysed the differences between the negotiation frameworks, pointing out its advantages and disadvantages.

Read more about the main points of the draft negotiation framework for Ukraine, presented for Albania and North Macedonia in 2020, in the article by Dmytro Lyvch, Ivan Nahorniak and Maria Shalamberidze – Framework for Ukraine's EU accession: what "carrots and sticks" the EU Commission offers to Kyiv.

Overall, the negotiation framework is an important document that establishes guidelines and principles for accession negotiations with each candidate country.

It is developed by the European Commission in parallel with the screening process, which involves checking Ukrainian legislation for compliance with EU law. Following this, the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference – the new bilateral body that will subsequently conduct the negotiations – takes place. Ukraine and the EU will finally approve the negotiating framework at this conference.

The draft negotiation framework for Ukraine reflects the so-called "revised enlargement methodology," introduced in 2020 with the approval of frameworks for Albania and North Macedonia.

Its key objective is to make the accession process "more predictable, credible, and dynamic."

The accession negotiations will be based on Ukraine's achievements and will not depend on the dynamics of other candidate countries.

The main innovation of the "revised methodology" is the "carrot and stick" system, which provides certain incentives for conscientious and timely implementation of accession requirements and a system of "punishments" for delays in the reform process.

In addition, the European Commission has included in the draft negotiation framework several seemingly insignificant but very useful updated provisions.

For example, Ukraine is no longer required to demonstrate general "commitment to good neighbourly relations," as Albania or North Macedonia. Instead, it is expected that Ukraine will maintain "friendship with neighbouring EU member states and other candidate countries."

It means that the EU recognises the impossibility of a political settlement of the military conflict with Russia any time soon.

So, it adjusts the requirement for general support for good neighbourly relations to Ukraine's context.

Even though Ukraine has been moving fairly quickly along the path of European integration, the proposed negotiation framework rejects the possible rapid integration for several reasons.

For example, member states still retain the right to initiate corrective measures through appeals to the European Commission, and the EU Council will still vote on these measures by a reverse qualified majority. This means that in case of a negative conclusion by the European Commission, resisting its influence through member states will be tough.

And this is not the only reason.

Moreover, it should be remembered that the proposed negotiation framework for Ukraine is only a draft that must be approved by the member states.

It will most likely to happen in June following the elections to the European Parliament.

Until that moment, any provisions of the framework can be changed, which may be influenced by the election results as well as the overall geopolitical tension due to Russia's full-scale war.