Why Croatia's new government may turn out pro-Russian

The parliamentary elections in Croatia on 17 April did not give a clear answer to the question of a change in power.

Even though the leading contender once again was the pro-Ukrainian ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), it didn't guarantee them the victory.

Read more about the possible changes in internal and foreign policy in Zagreb following the parliamentary elections, which may also affect relations with Ukraine, in the article by Natalia Ishchenko a Balkan Observer editor – Right-wing populists or "Putin's friends": why Croatia's elections did not erase threats for Ukraine.

According to the elections, the Croatian Democratic Union will receive 61 seats (out of 151) in the Croatian Parliament (Sabor).

Prime Minister Andrej Plenković's party needs to seek new allies to stay in power, but they are facing significant challenges.

Previously, the possible alliance with HDZ was ruled out by the Homeland Movement (14 seats), Most (11 seats) and Možemo! (10 seats). It is impossible to gain a majority without them.

The reason is the corruption scandals of the Plenković government, which led to massive protests in recent months.

It makes more likely for the Social Democrats (SDP), 42 seats, to form a government.

Almost all political observers are confident: the "golden share" belongs to the Homeland Movement.

The party, relatively recently created and being in constant crises throughout its short history, is now called the "most desirable bride."

It is no coincedence that Prime Minister Plenković who had repeatedly ruled out a coalition with the Homeland Movement before the elections, has sharply changed his stance in recent days.

The Homeland Movement effectively holds the key to maintaining HDZ's power or coming to power of their opponents, the SDP.

The most likely coalition alliance is still considered to be the HDZ + Homeland Movement.

What will be the likely coalition government of HDZ + Homeland Movement like?

The main change, as expected, will affect the policy towards the Serbian minority.

These changes will not by default mean an exacerbation of interethnic relations but will effectively mark the end of the post-war era of reconciliation and forgiveness.

Another change is that Croatian policy will become more conservative and less compliant with European standards regarding LGBT rights, gender issues, migration, etc. The course correction may be slight but will certainly be seen to the Homeland Movement electorate. If this happens, it could lead to misunderstandings with Brussels.

Some changes are also possible in relations with Ukraine.

The Homeland Movement demonstratively shows no interest in the war in Ukraine and accuses Plenković of caring more about Ukraine than about his own country and people in these turbulent times.

It does not mean that the Homeland Movement will seek to stop aid to Ukraine or change its policy to pro-Russian. But the position of official Zagreb, provided the HDZ and Homeland Movement coalition government is formed, will become less empathetic and more pragmatic.

If a coalition is formed around the SDP and the current President Zoran Milanović manages to become prime minister, this option would be the worst possible for Ukraine out of all possible ones.