What strategy should Ukraine adopt to counter Orbán's blackmail on minority?
The issue of minority rights has predictably become a topic of negotiation for Ukraine's EU accession even before the official launch of talks.
Ukraine is not the first candidate country to face this, so it's worth understanding the actual requirements of the European Union. Indeed, it is necessary to align national legislation with EU law (including in this area) and secure the political agreement of all member states before joining.
Read more about the legitimacy of Hungary's demands and how Kyiv should respond in the article by Viktoriia Khalanchuk, Oxford University's diplomatic studies graduate – Orbán's distorted mirror. Why Ukraine should not fulfil some of Hungary's demands.
First of all, before Ukraine joins the EU, we indeed need to incorporate all the provisions of the so-called acquis communautaire, the body of EU law, into our legislation.
However, the European Union does not have comprehensive legislative frameworks on national minorities. The exceptions are only specific acquis acts concerning anti-discrimination, Roma policies, etc.
On the one hand, respecting minority rights is one of the key requirements for candidate states. On the other, these requirements in the EU are not formalised.
Due to this, in assessing whether a state has the necessary level of minority protection, the EU primarily relies on the norms and instruments of the Council of Europe. It is mainly about the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The former is intended to provide legal protection to national minorities, while the latter focuses on linguistic diversity as part of Europe’s cultural heritage.
These should form the basis of Ukraine’s discussion with Hungary on national minority issues.
Besides these binding instruments, there is also so-called soft law: standards and best practices within the Council of Europe and OSCE.
Unfortunately, under Hungary's pressure, the Ukrainian side, instead of analysing its international obligations, agreed to the approach of "there are Hungarian demands, and Ukraine must meet them."
Hungary's demands can be roughly divided into two groups. The first includes classic "red lines" known to both sides, which are neither international obligations nor best practices.
The second consists of technical issues that Ukraine could and should have considered during the development of the relevant law (such as the use of minority symbols) or those excessively detailed legal matters that should not have been the subject of political bilateral negotiations but have become so.
The groundwork for Hungarian criticism to some extent was laid by the rushed drafting of the law on national minorities and the disregard for bilateral relations experience.
But even if Hungarian criticism could have been minimised, avoiding it altogether is unrealistic.
For Orbán's government, the issue of minorities is just a tool setting the tone for the political game.
Ukraine should change its strategy in this game. Move away from the role of the underachieving student and shift the discussion from "Hungarian demands" to "Kyiv's international obligations." In implementing these obligations, Hungary could indeed learn a lot from Ukraine.
Moreover, Ukraine must remember that minority policy should consider internal processes and certainly should not be based on "Hungarian demands," which could foster euroscepticism in the future. This is a serious risk that is unfortunately often overlooked in Ukraine.