How Poles perceive historical dispute with Ukraine – a perspective from Warsaw
Poland's Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, has recently stated that Ukraine cannot join EU before resolving historical issues with Poland.
The new Polish government has increased pressure on Kyiv, primarily demanding the lifting of the moratorium on search and exhumation in Volhynia.
Will lifting this moratorium be enough to resolve all of Poland’s "historical" claims against Ukraine? Will Ukraine "join the EU with Bandera"? Or will Poland instead begin to follow through on its threats, blocking Ukraine's path to the European Union?
Read more in the article by Yurii Panchenko, a European Pravda editor, who discussed these questions with Lukasz Adamski, deputy director of the Juliusz Mieroszewski Dialogue Center – To the EU with Bandera: A Polish perspective on the "historical" clash with Ukraine.
First of all, Poland's claims are focused on one main issue – the moratorium introduced by Ukraine on search and exhumation.
The problem is that several tens of thousands of civilian citizens, mostly Poles, cannot be properly buried in Ukraine.
This is precisely what Prime Minister Tusk referred to.
This issue arose due to the mass destruction of both Polish monuments in Ukraine and Ukrainian monuments in Poland in 2015-2017.
In response to the destruction of Ukrainian monuments in Poland and the hasty investigations into those crimes, Ukraine introduced a so-called moratorium on search and exhumation of Poles who were killed in 1943-45 by UPA. The search needs to be conducted first.
Since then, this has been an issue in our relations.
Polish society has a consensus to pressure Ukraine, so it finally allows the search and exhumation to ultimately establish cemeteries for the victims of the Volhynia massacre.
Ukraine's position is well-known: since Ukrainian monuments in Poland were destroyed, they need to be restored, at least those that were legally erected.
One of these monuments is located on Monastyr Hill, a few kilometers from the border – a grave of soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) who died in battles with the NKVD.
This grave was initially destroyed and later restored, but it is not exactly as it was before. Ukraine considers this the reason why exhumations cannot resume.
So, on the one hand, it's about allowing the burial of people whose remains are scattered somewhere. On the other hand, there's a dispute about the appearance of an existing grave.
This sparks significant outrage in Polish public opinion, pushing politicians toward a strategy of direct pressure on Ukraine.
Why can't Poland fulfil its promises, particularly regarding the monument on Monastyr Hill? The Polish Institute of National Remembrance claims there are certain doubts about this grave, and additional research is needed.
As for Stepan Bandera, despite my negative assessment of his role, I don't believe he is the main problem in Polish-Ukrainian relations.
A bigger issue is Roman Shukhevych, who gave criminal orders (a claim not shared by most Ukrainian historians – Ed.), but not Bandera. Shukhevych is a more complicated case, though he is not as popular in Ukraine.
I repeat, Polish politicians understand that Ukraine must be in both NATO and the EU. I believe they understand that the issue of national memory requires dialogue, but it cannot block security matters.
Nonetheless, the issue of exhumations stirs such emotions that it often complicates a rational assessment of Ukraine’s motivations.