What's going on with protests in Georgia and why the government hasn’t won yet

On Saturday, 16 November, Georgia’s Central Election Commission finalised the results of the parliamentary elections held on 26 October.

Neither the mass protests outside the election commission’s office and criticism of the elections from the West, nor even the public defacement of the CEC chairman prevented the formal conclusion of the election process.

At first glance, this appears to be a victory for the ruling Georgian Dream party, which secured a parliamentary majority, allowing it to independently form the government and determine the country’s political course.

This "victory" though may prove Pyrrhic, argue Amiran Khevtsuriani, founder of the Georgian-Ukrainian Center, and Yurii Panchenko, the European Pravda editor, in their article Georgian Dream claims victory: Does the opposition still have a chance for revolution?

One key factor behind Georgian Dream’s initial success was the opposition’s disunity and shock over the scale of electoral fraud.

Mass protests only began days after the election and initially failed to maintain momentum. The first large protest was, for a long time, the only one of its scale.

The opposition appeared to conserve its supporters' energy, but this strategy backfired. Even when the opposition managed to organise large demonstrations, they remained resolutely peaceful, failing to disrupt the government’s plans.

In contrast, Georgian Dream pursued a strategy of outlasting the protests, legitimising the election results, and then engaging in negotiations with the EU to trade certain concessions for recognition of the elections.

One of the few tools available to the opposition is refusing to participate in the new parliament.

However, ahead of the elections, Georgian Dream simplified the parliamentary launch process – a simple majority of MPs is sufficient to open parliament.

In response, the opposition is threatening to boycott legislative work to avoid legitimising a parliament elected through fraud. They are even considering resigning their mandates, though this would be extremely difficult to achieve.

Such uncertainty gives Georgian Dream the opportunity to "buy off" or intimidate individual opposition MPs. Intimidation has begun. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has threatened to ban opposition parties that refuse to work in parliament, potentially using the Constitutional Court to achieve this. However, such a move is fraught with danger.

Another decisive factor is the forthcoming full report from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

Western countries are waiting for this report before making a final decision on whether to recognise the election results and, by extension, the government’s legitimacy.

However, it's important to acknowledge that the decision to recognise or not recognise the elections will ultimately be political.

This decision will depend not only on international observers’ recommendations but also on the dynamics in Washington, European leaders' willingness to take a hard stance (often blocked by Viktor Orbán, a staunch ally of the Georgian government), the progress of street protests, and the opposition’s ability to resist government pressure.

What would Western non-recognition and sanctions change?

In short, everything or nearly everything.

To date, the EU and the US have avoided a truly hardline approach to Georgia.

The victory of a pro-European Georgia will not come easily. However, a decisive stance from the West could reinvigorate the opposition and provide a real chance for success.