Will "Balkan Trump" lead Croatia again and what could this mean for Ukraine?

On Sunday, 12 January, Croatia will hold the second round of its presidential election.

In the first round, held on 29 December, the incumbent pro-Russian president, Zoran Milanović, secured 49.09% of the vote and came close to winning outright.

At first glance, the results of the first round leave little room for intrigue. Milanović’s opponent appears to have slim chances of victory.

Read more in the article by Volodymyr Tsybulnyk, a historian and Western Balkans expert – Blow to pro-Ukrainian Croatia: could the presidential election lead to a policy shift?

On one hand, Milanović's anticipated victory is not surprising. Out of five Croatian presidents, two have been re-elected for a second term.

On the other hand, his opponent, Dragan Primorac, from the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), failed to gain an advantage despite strong party backing and spending four times more on his campaign.

According to local media, Primorac received nearly half of his funding from US sponsors, where he had previously worked for many years. Meanwhile, Milanović allegedly received financial support from an unidentified "Russian oligarch."

Milanović’s campaign was unsensational. His speeches remained simple, sometimes crude, relatable to ordinary voters, and often offensive towards his rival.

Milanović’s political statements regarding the EU, NATO, and support for Ukraine increasingly mirrored the rhetoric of the newly elected US president, as did his campaign style, earning him the nickname "Balkan Trump."

Dragan Primorac, meanwhile, found himself in a more difficult position. Garnering just 20% in the first round is hardly a promising result.

The Croatian Democratic Union was panicking following the first round, with some calling to abandon Primorac altogether, fearing his defeat would reflect poorly on HDZ and its leader, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković.

Indeed, Primorac’s candidacy seemed a poor choice. However, the issue extends beyond the candidate himself.

Prime Minister Plenković had sensed growing dissatisfaction among the public long before the election due to HDZ’s prolonged rule, marred by corruption scandals.

However, the initial panic within the party soon subsided. Party members quickly mobilised, implementing extraordinary measures and seeking additional votes.

According to unconfirmed reports, all HDZ members were instructed to bring at least three supporters to the polls on 12 January to back Primorac.

Efforts were also intensified to engage right-wing party leaders whose candidacies were withdrawn during the registration stage.

There was hope that hearing Milanović’s sharp criticism of the EU and NATO, along with reports of his friendly ties with controversial Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, would prompt voters concerned about Croatia’s foreign policy direction, but who refrained from voting in the first round due to discontent with HDZ, to come out and cast their votes for Primorac.

Formally speaking, regardless of who wins the second round, no drastic changes in either domestic or foreign policy are expected, as the Croatian president holds a largely ceremonial role.

However, the situation may not be as simple as it seems.

First, if Milanović wins, the ongoing destructive conflict between the president and prime minister will persist, with key issues remaining control over the military and intelligence services.

Second, tensions between the president and government regarding support for Ukraine will likely continue.