How aggression against Ukraine changes Serbian attitudes toward Russia and whether Moscow can fix it

February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, marked the beginning of a shift in many pro-Russian narratives in Serbia and initiated a process of re-evaluating attitudes toward Russia and its actions.

These changes, as noted by Volodymyr Tsybulnyk, historian and former Chargé d'Affaires of Ukraine in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2018), are clearly not in Russia’s favour.

Read more in his full article – Russia fears losing Serbia: how the Kremlin strengthened its "soft power" and how Ukraine should respond.

According to Tsybulnyk, Serbian authorities, and particularly President Aleksandar Vučić, are increasingly facing pointed and "dangerous" questions from citizens, especially the youth, which demand equally pointed answers:

– Why is "Kosovo Serbia" but "Crimea Russia," when Crimea is part of Ukraine?
– How do NATO’s 1999 bombings of Serbia differ from Russia’s missile strikes on Ukrainian cities?

"These questions and the search for answers have begun to change the attitudes of ordinary Serbs toward Russia," Tsybulnyk notes.

He adds that Serbia’s consistent support for Ukraine in international organisations, ammunition supplies, and generally positive direct interactions between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Aleksandar Vučić have also contributed to a decline in affection for Moscow.

The expert emphasises, however, that Serbs have not yet become friends of Ukraine. But they have started to question whether Russia is truly a friend and ally.

"In Moscow, noticing the trend of rising anti-Russian sentiment, there was initial confusion and reflection: what should we do? Economic ties with Serbia are rapidly shrinking, cheap Russian gas is almost gone, and cooperation in defence industry is shifting toward NATO countries and China…" Tsybulnyk writes.

At this point, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rossotrudnichestvo remembered "soft power" and, more specifically, the potential of Russian cultural colonialism. They shifted the focus of their hybrid warfare in Serbia to history, art exhibitions, ballet, and music.

According to Tsybulnyk, almost overnight, just before Christmas, Serbian media were filled with announcements of numerous cultural (or pseudo-cultural) events: Hermitage Days, a reading competition in honour of the 100th anniversary of the Artek Pioneer Camp, an exhibition dedicated to Peter I, visits by so-called celebritites of Moscow’s ballet and opera, and films about Russian emperors and "heroes."

"But when a person receives truthful information, they inevitably exclaim: this can’t be true! So much lies!" Tsybulnyk says, criticising Russian propaganda. His full column delves into the falsehoods spread by Russia in Serbia.

All these events are set to begin just before 24 February, the grim anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Tsybulnyk calls on Ukraine to resist these efforts.

According to him, Ukrainian diplomatic missions, with the help of the Ukrainian diaspora, will organise some countermeasures, albeit with limited resources and little funding. They will send protest notes, hold exhibitions, and occasionally organise concerts.

"This is where not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also other ministries, those of national unity, culture and strategic communications, youth, and sports, should step up and demonstrate their potential.

But not through directives and plans, rather through organising specific events and providing real support to overseas missions. Only by combining efforts can Russian propaganda be defeated, even in Serbia," Tsybulnyk concludes.