How Russia is trying to destroy Moldova and what could prevent it

While Russia's "energy war" against Moldova remains outside the focus of major global players, these developments, rapidly escalating in recent days, hold significant importance for Ukraine.

If the Kremlin achieves its goal, a massive Russian stronghold could emerge "behind Ukraine's back," i.e., on its western border, explains Vlad Kulminski in a conversation with European Pravda.

Kulminski, a former Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova responsible for reintegration (including Transnistria), currently holds no official position, granting him sufficient independence. However, he remains one of the voices President Maia Sandu listens to.

Read more in the article – Transnistria is no longer a frozen conflict. Russia has shattered this 'fridge.'

Russia's current objective is to sharply increase electricity bills in Moldova, triggering a chain reaction of rising prices for all goods.

Since 2006, Russia has supplied gas to the Transnistrian region free of charge, while Chișinău had to purchase it at high prices.

This "free gas" in Transnistria also benefited Moldova because the Kuchurgan Power Plant, located on the left bank of the Dniester River (in Transnistria), used this gas to produce electricity, which was then sold cheaply to Moldova’s right bank.

For Transnistria’s residents, gas and electricity were even cheaper.
Now, Russia plans to resume free gas supplies to Transnistria but with a caveat: to meet internal needs, such as heating homes, while ensuring no electricity is supplied to the right bank of the Dniester.

This means that for Moldovans in Chișinău, gas and electricity will be ten times more expensive than for Moldovans in Tiraspol. Consequently, dissatisfaction with the government in Chișinău will rise, leading voters to support different parties in parliamentary elections.

This is part of Russia's efforts to steer Moldova away from its European path. The ultimate goal is to ensure Moldova remains within Russia's sphere of influence and prevent it from fully aligning with the West.

To achieve this, Russia aims to change Moldova’s government, not to a pro-Russian one (an impossible scenario now) but to one that would accept Moldova’s status as an "in-between state," a gray zone, or a "buffer state."

Kulminski emphasises that Moldova's existence as a state today is thanks to Ukraine and its Armed Forces. Without Ukraine, Moldova might not exist anymore.

That’s why the Kremlin no longer seeks to turn Moldova into a pro-Russian state. It knows this is unfeasible. Instead, Russia hopes that the next Moldovan parliament, with elections set to be held in the next autumn, will include a coalition of parties willing to accept Moldova as a buffer zone.

This scenario poses a threat to Ukraine, as it could lead to a government in Chișinău that collaborates with and listens to Russia.

Kulminski describes any attempt by a future government in Chișinău to pivot toward Russia as geopolitical suicide.

By resuming limited gas supplies to Transnistria, its primary budget revenue source won’t be restored. This means the previous status quo in Transnistria, which kept the conflict frozen for years, has been destroyed. The "fridge" that kept this conflict on ice no longer exists.

This opens the door to Moldova’s reintegration in the short or medium term.

Kulminski estimates a 60% chance that Moldova will retain its pro-European government. However, every vote in the upcoming elections will count.

Ukraine and the European Union could play a vital role in helping Moldova secure its European trajectory.