How the Language Charter was used for Russification and what is being done to fix it

In late December 2024, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers registered a bill that went largely unnoticed but is of great significance. It aims to correct a long-standing legislative error from two decades ago that has caused numerous problems and significantly influenced Ukraine’s socio-political landscape.

The issue lies with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

Ukraine is the only Council of Europe member state to have ratified the Charter using the term "languages of national minorities" in its title, instead of the original "minority languages." All other states translated the text verbatim without this mistake.

This fundamentally altered the document's essence, and the government initiative seeks to address this.

Read more about the issue and the attempt to rectify in the article by Oksana Zabolotna, analyst of the Centre for United Action – "Minority languages" in service of the Kremlin: why Shmyhal’s government amends the Charter and what could be improved.

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was created to support endangered or disappearing languages spoken by small populations.

States joining the Charter were required to determine which languages fell under its scope.

For example, Finland, upon ratifying the Charter, included Inari Sámi, Karelian, Northern Sámi, Romani, Russian, Skolt Sámi, Swedish, Tatar, and Yiddish on its list, covering both endangered languages and those of neighbouring states.

In Ukraine’s 2003 ratification law, the following regional or minority languages were listed: Belarusian, Bulgarian, Gagauz, Greek, Hebrew, Crimean Tatar, Moldovan, German, Polish, Russian, Romanian, Slovak and Hungarian.

Among these, only two languages clearly meet the Charter’s goals: Gagauz and Crimean Tatar.

The remaining 11 languages on Ukraine’s list are state languages of other countries.

The situation is further complicated by questions surrounding Greek and Hebrew, as mentioned in the ratification law. It is assumed the reference is to Modern Greek and Hebrew and/or Yiddish.
Additionally, the issue of the "Moldovan language" has recently come under scrutiny.

In practice, the Charter in Ukraine was implemented through the infamous 2012 law On the Principles of State Language Policy, commonly known as the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law. This law distorted the Charter’s intent via a mistranslation, allowing pro-Russian politicians to use it as a tool for Ukraine’s Russification.

In 2019, Ukraine’s parliament passed the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language, fundamentally changing the approach to implementing the Charter. However, the mistranslation that once facilitated Russification, manipulation, and societal discord remained unaddressed.

Over the years, the erroneous translation has come to be seen as accurate within Ukraine. The government’s December 2024 bill seeks to correct this misperception.

First, it aligns the Ukrainian title and provisions of this international treaty with the original text.

Second, it removes Russian and the non-existent "Moldovan language" from the list, adding Czech instead. References to Hebrew and Greek are clarified as Modern Hebrew and Modern Greek.

There is room for improvement though in the draft bill. For example, the list of languages eligible for Charter protection could include those truly in need, such as Yiddish, Karaim, Krymchak, Romani, Rumeika, and Urum.

The bill may still be revised by parliamentary committees and adopted in a way that better aligns with the Charter’s purpose while also countering Russian propaganda.