How Putin might use Slovak PM to protect Russia’s assets in the EU and what Ukraine should do
On 8 November 2024, at the press conference following the European Political Community summit, Volodymyr Zelenskyy raised the issue of confiscating the frozen reserves of Russia's Central Bank held in the jurisdictions of Ukraine’s allies.
"Can we take the $300 billion that is rightfully ours? Can we decide what weapons we need? Can we decide what to do with this money? Can no European country block this money?" the Ukrainian president asked passionately.
This statement effectively triggered a new phase of discussions about the fate of frozen Russian assets. By early 2025, these debates were often taking unexpected turns. Read more in the article by Ivan Horodysky, director of the Dnistryanskyi Center – Money for reconstruction or war? What Ukraine must do to ensure successful confiscation of Russian assets.
A few days after Zelenskyy's speech, Kaia Kallas, the former Prime Minister of Estonia and current High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, made a bold statement during hearings in the European Parliament.
In her address, Kallas affirmed Ukraine's legitimate grounds for demanding compensation from Russia and emphasized the need for EU member states to overcome their hesitations regarding the fate of frozen Russian assets.
This statement by a high-ranking EU official marked one of the most significant public developments in recent months regarding the debate over the fate of the Russian Central Bank reserves frozen in European bank accounts. Until now, the issue of confiscating these assets had been largely avoided at the official level.
The European Union and the Group of Seven have consistently reiterated their position: the assets would remain frozen until some abstract future moment when Russia voluntarily agrees to compensate Ukraine for the damages caused by its aggression.
Although no additional official statements have been made in Brussels, numerous insider reports in the media suggest that discussions on the (non-)confiscation of Russian assets are actively ongoing.
Among the EU countries opposing confiscation, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg are most frequently mentioned.
Hungary and Slovakia also stand out for demonstrating the most Russia-friendly positions in Europe.
However, this opposition may be mitigated by one significant factor: Donald Trump.
If the US president-elect were to back this idea, he might also influence his key ally in the EU, Viktor Orbán, potentially motivating Hungary to support such a move.
In this context, the greatest uncertainty lies with the possible position of official Bratislava, which remains unclear and enigmatic.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico could emerge as the Kremlin's "reserve joker" within the EU.
On Christmas Eve, Politico revealed details of closed-door talks between Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. One of the key topics discussed was the fate of frozen Russian assets.
According to the publication, Fico claimed that the Ukrainian leader allegedly attempted to "bribe" him by offering compensation of 500 million euros for losses that Slovakia might incur if Russian gas transit through Ukraine were to cease.
Fico stated that this compensation was to come from frozen Russian assets, and in return, Ukraine expected Slovakia to support its bid for NATO membership.
Zelenskyy's proposal to Fico could indirectly confirm the realistic prospect of confiscating the Central Bank of Russia's reserves in the medium term.
At the same time, alongside these external challenges, there is a crucial internal question that the current Ukrainian government must address: what is the specific plan for utilizing Russian assets after their confiscation?
This represents the third key element of the "confiscation formula": legal grounds – already established; political will – as evidenced by Kaia Kallas' statements, which reflect growing support; an a specific goal – still to be clearly determined.