Why the energy crisis in Transnistria is part of Russia’s plan against Ukraine
On 1 January, Transnistria, a Russia-controlled breakaway region of Moldova, entered an energy crisis of unprecedented scale.
Following Ukraine’s refusal to extend an agreement allowing Russian gas to transit Ukraine, the region’s population of 300,000 has been left without gas, heating and hot water. Cold water is supplied intermittently.
All (!) industrial companies have been shut down. Periods of power outages are constantly increasing, now reaching up to eight hours per day. The hours when power is still available may soon stop completely as the only thermal power plant in the region is running out of coal.
Read more in the article by Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor – Kremlin’s hybrid strategy in Transnistria: Moldova’s crisis, Ukraine’s chance, and threat to EU integration
It looks like everything is unfolding according to the Kremlin’s plan.
The abrupt escalation of the energy crisis in Transnistria, triggered by the cessation of Russian gas supplies on 1 January, has not led to any dialogue between Tiraspol and Chișinău.
Such a dire situation should compel Transnistrian authorities to seek alternative sources of gas and electricity. However, this is not happening.
On the contrary, this year Tiraspol rejected Chișinău’s official offer to help procure gas. Tiraspol also rejected Chișinău’s offer to help buy gas, even when Chișinău promised to find Western financing for a transitional period.
The authorities in Transnistria continue to wait for free gas from Russia, even though Gazprom has refrained from making any statements on the matter in the past week.
Meanwhile, Transnistrian authorities are acting as if the supply will resume very soon.
The Kremlin’s next step is predictable: a pro-Russian politician from Moldova will head to Moscow. To show that pro-Western President Sandu is unable to negotiate a gas deal, Moscow may present the opposite example. Most likely, a pro-Russian politician from Moldova will head to Moscow soon and return with gas from Putin. The narrative will be that the entire problem lies with Sandu. "She makes you pay more just so Moldova doesn't get along with Russia."
Chișinău is convinced that the Kremlin is preparing exactly this scenario.
This performance is being staged for the parliamentary elections in 2025. People are being convinced that if Moldova were governed by pro-Russian politicians instead of Sandu and her government, people would pay less.
Who will become this "saviour"? This remains unknown. It could be Igor Dodon, or Irina Vlah, the former leader of the Gagauzia region, or the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, who lives in Moscow and has become a Kremlin favourite in recent years.
For Putin, it is critical that Moldova lacks access to affordable electricity, forcing people to pay more, envy Transnistrians who "managed to resolve the issue," and blame their problems on the current pro-Western government.
This plan is centered on the parliamentary elections in Moldova, which are due to be held in autumn 2025. The Kremlin’s goal is to replace Moldova’s current pro-Western government with a pro-Russian one and to block the country’s further alignment with the West, not just for four years but potentially for decades.
If this happens, it will mean the end of Moldova’s EU integration.
But it will also mean the end of Ukraine’s EU integration.
Officially, the EU says that each country joins the bloc individually. However, in reality, for many countries, Ukraine and Moldova are considered a single "enlargement package."
For example, Romania is currently one of the strongest advocates of the joint accession of Moldova and Ukraine. But if Moldova were to disappear, the Romanians would not promote Ukraine’s accession. Similarly, Italy and France, for whom Moldova holds particular significance, would lose enthusiasm for Ukraine's EU ambitions.
The current crisis is particularly dangerous because Chișinău lacks a clear strategy for resolving it.
Nevertheless, Ukraine has the resources to play this game.