Why PACE changes trends toward Ukraine and how the Council of Europe can help
A session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) took place in Strasbourg in the last week of February. European Pravda provided in-depth coverage of the event, including the struggle between supporters and opponents of punishing the current Georgian government.
One crucial aspect remained largely unnoticed though – the shift in European parliamentarians’ attitudes toward Ukrainian initiatives.
For the first time since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine lost a political battle in PACE, not on a Ukrainian issue, but on a Georgian one, which still set a precedent. Additionally, the debates on a resolution concerning Ukraine took place in an almost empty chamber.
Read more to understand what is happening, what these processes mean, and why PACE and the Council of Europe remain important despite these changes in the article by Sergiy Sydorenko, European Pravda's editor, who spoke with Oleksii Honcharenko, a PACE member since 2015 – Honcharenko: "Those who lifted sanctions from Russia years ago are now gaining influence in Europe."
Last week in Strasbourg, we witnessed Russia’s friends regaining influence. This is a real trend shift.
This "rollback" was not entirely unexpected. It was bound to happen. It’s like a pendulum: in 2022, it swung too far in favour of Ukraine’s support, and that level of backing could not last indefinitely.
Once again, politicians advocating for "peace at any cost" and "the need for dialogue" are gaining traction. Many of them are the same individuals who, six years ago, reinstated Russia in PACE and lifted sanctions without requiring compliance with its obligations.
The most concerning statements came from the Hungarian delegation (which was expected) as well as from representatives of the far-right and far-left, including Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).
At the same time, the bureaucratic system within PACE, particularly its secretariat, has also been inclined to "look the other way" regarding violations. For the bureaucrats in Strasbourg, the fact that PACE loses a member country almost every year is a problem.
Despite the current challenges, including attempts to "forgive" Georgia, there are no discussions about reinstating Russia in the Council of Europe, at least for now. I say "for now" because I am certain these voices will emerge once active hostilities in Ukraine cease.
In the West, there is a prevailing notion that Russia is a permanent entity – a constant. They assume that Russia has always existed and always will. The idea that Russia is a colonial empire, like others that have collapsed in history, is not even considered.
When I suggest in discussions with European colleagues that Russia might not exist in the future, the reaction is always one of shock: "What do you mean, Russia won’t exist? How is that possible?"
PACE decisions previously could have been made simply with Ukraine’s backing. That is no longer the case, for two main reasons.
Firstly, Western politicians are experiencing "Ukraine fatigue."
Secondly, the Council of Europe, an organisation with 46 member states, cannot focus solely on Ukraine.
That said, Ukraine still enjoys strong support.
There are two key practical expectations:
Firstly, the creation of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression.
Secondly, the operation of the Register of Damages caused by Russian aggression and preparations for compensation claims against Russia.
Next week in Brussels, a preparatory meeting on the tribunal will take place, involving the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
Regarding the compensation mechanism, specific steps are already being outlined. This year, a commission will be established to review Ukrainian citizens’ claims for compensation.
Finally, PACE’s political resolutions remain crucial. They shape the mainstream European stance on Ukraine, which carries significant weight.