Who emerges as Romania’s main pro-Russian presidential candidate and what are his chances?
Romania’s Constitutional Court has officially ruled out the participation of far-right candidate Călin Georgescu in the presidential elections.
Now, George Simion, the leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), is attempting to take up Georgescu’s mantle and become Romania’s next president.
He has a strong chance, especially given the failure of pro-Western politicians to unite.
Read more about George Simion and his stance on Ukraine in the article by Serhiy Herasymchuk, Deputy Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism," and Yurii Panchenko, European Pravda's editor – A shift on the far-right flank: what we know about Romania’s new presidential frontrunner.
Some in Romania and beyond may see George Simion as a more acceptable candidate compared to Călin Georgescu.
Simion is less radical in his rhetoric, his party is part of the moderately Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament (led by former Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki from Law and Justice), and he has never openly expressed support for Russia.
However, the reality is more complex. Simion is no more acceptable than Georgescu, and his background and connections within Romania’s far-right circles reveal why.
One of the key links between them is that in 2020, AUR itself nominated Călin Georgescu for the position of Romania’s prime minister.
This connection increases the likelihood that Georgescu’s motivated electorate will turn out on election day and support the candidate closest to their former leader–Simion.
Simion’s party, AUR, has also increasingly exploited the Ukraine issue in recent years, posing risks for Ukraine.
The party has opposed providing weapons to Ukraine and flatly rejected the transfer of Romanian Patriot air defence systems to Kyiv.
AUR has campaigned against Ukrainian agricultural transit through Romania and even attempted to organise border protests.
One of AUR’s leading figures, Claudiu Târziu, who holds Legionnaire (fascist) views, has spoken about the need for Romania to reclaim Ukrainian territories that once belonged to it, claiming that Romania cannot be a true state without them.
There are also suspicions of Russian influence within AUR.
In 2023, former Moldovan Defence Minister Anatol Șalaru claimed that Simion had contacts with Russian intelligence agents during a 2011 trip to Chernivtsi, Ukraine.
Ukrainian security services seem to share these concerns, as Simion was banned from entering Ukraine on 15 November 2024, for systematic anti-Ukrainian activities.
In other words, while Călin Georgescu was an openly pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian candidate, his replacement Simion holds similar views but is more subtle about them.
The latest Sociopol poll, conducted in early March, showed Simion at 28% if Georgescu were removed from the race.
Even this level of support makes the AUR leader a frontrunner. His chances could improve further if he successfully mobilises Georgescu’s electorate to vote for him.
Another decisive factor will be who faces Simion in the second round. It is already clear that pro-Western forces are unlikely to unite.
As a result, while democratic forces remain divided, the far-right gains electoral ground to Russia’s delight.