Can France’s nuclear forces replace the US and protect all of Europe?

Donald Trump’s return to the White House, and more importantly, the conflict between his new administration and most NATO allies, is already leading to changes that seemed utterly unrealistic just six months ago.

Amid the potential withdrawal of US troops from Europe, French President Emmanuel Macron has stated that he is ready to offer France’s "nuclear umbrella" to protect other European nations. Moreover, nearly 60% of French citizens support this initiative.

Several EU countries have expressed their willingness to host French nuclear weapons.

But does France have the nuclear capability to fully replace the US, and do these changes effectively signal the end of the global nuclear non-proliferation system? Find out more in an interview with Harvard University nuclear policy researcher Mariana Budjeryn – Europe under France's nuclear umbrella: key questions about Macron’s initiative.

France’s proposal to use its nuclear arsenal to protect Europe could work, but only at a minimal, existential deterrence level.

The assumption is that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is a sufficient deterrent, and that even a small nuclear arsenal could scare an adversary into avoiding escalation.

However, the US strategy of extended nuclear deterrence is far more advanced and comprehensive, involving detailed simulations of a full-scale thermonuclear war.

France cannot replicate this under any circumstances.

The French nuclear forces consist only of submarines armed with ballistic missiles and Rafale aircraft equipped with nuclear-capable cruise missiles with a range of 2,000 km.

Clearly, Europeans would have to carefully consider how to reliably deploy these forces, if such a decision were even made, which is far from certain.

So far, this is only a political statement.

Yes, it is a significant statement, as it demonstrates France’s serious commitment to European security. But there is a long way to go between this declaration and actual operational planning and force deployment.

Most likely, the platform for this "nuclear umbrella" would be something like "NATO-minus," that is, NATO without the US and possibly without certain countries like Hungary and Slovakia.

This would be a coalition of the willing and committed states, potentially within NATO but with a separate strategic planning group made up of nations willing to participate.

There are already precedents for differentiated participation in NATO’s various security structures.

What about the UK? Britain’s strategic deterrence forces depend on the US, unlike the more autonomous French forces. Right now, the UK is likely to stay quiet and observe developments.

Germany has primarily expressed interest in France extending its nuclear umbrella over German territory and possibly other countries.

Poland, on the other hand, has made more ambiguous statements that could be interpreted as a desire to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

Of course, this would violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and likely face strong opposition. But at the same time, the entire global order built after World War II is now under immense strain, with alliances, norms, and rules being increasingly challenged.

While nuclear weapons are not simple to develop, they are also not exclusively accessible to a select few nations. These are, after all, mid-20th-century technologies.