How Poland can help Ukraine on its path to the EU and what obstacles may arise
At the end of 2023, the European Union decided to begin accession negotiations with Ukraine, and in 2024, it approved the "negotiating framework," formally opening talks.
Not a single one of the 35 negotiation chapters has been opened yet.
It is both important and symbolic that a decision to open negotiations on specific chapters under the fundamentals cluster might be made during Poland’s presidency over the EU Council.
Ukraine's minimum expectation for 2025 is the opening of two or three negotiation clusters, while the maximum goal is all six.
Read more about how Poland can assist in the article by Dmytro Shulha, director of the Europe and the World programme of the International Renaissance Foundation – Chance or challenge: What Poland’s EU presidency means for Ukraine.
Poland's presidency over the EU Council presents an opportunity for Warsaw and for Polish-Ukrainian collaboration and coordination at the European level.
First, Poland’s presidency could initiate EU Council decisions to open several negotiation clusters immediately after receiving corresponding screening reports from the European Commission.
Ukraine’s EU accession follows a much more complex procedure than Poland’s entry once did.
The current process is stretched out due to the need to complete numerous stages involving decisions by various EU institutions.
It is not enough for a candidate country to complete its "homework" on implementing EU acquis. All decisions in the EU Council are made by consensus, making the process vulnerable to political pressure from individual member states.
This is why Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, following the European Council's decision to open negotiations with Ukraine in December 2023, stated that he would have 75 opportunities to veto and block Ukraine’s EU membership.
In contrast, Poland’s presidency could elevate the discussion on updating (improving and simplifying) the enlargement methodology to a political level.
Furthermore, Poland’s presidency will begin discussions on the EU’s new financial framework for 2028-2034, which must account for Ukraine’s future accession during this period.
As research by Brussels think tanks shows, Ukraine’s membership would have virtually no effect on the division of EU member states into net recipients and net contributors.
Countries that experience successful economic growth eventually transition from net recipients to net contributors (as is expected to happen with Poland soon), regardless of Ukraine’s EU membership.
Economic statistics clearly show that current EU support measures for Ukraine already bring not only strategic and security benefits but also trade and economic advantages for the EU itself, especially for Poland.
In the long term, the economic benefits of Ukraine’s integration for the European Union are expected to grow even further.
Expectations for Polish support of Ukraine’s progress toward EU membership might seem surprising, given that Poland, at the national level in 2023, initiated protective restrictions against Ukrainian agricultural products.
Moreover, after this decision, Poland implemented a physical blockade of the EU-Ukraine border.
These high-profile events reinforced the perception that Ukraine’s integration into the EU single market allegedly contradicts Polish economic interests.
However, Poland is the primary beneficiary of trade with Ukraine within the EU.
It is unacceptable that blocking the EU-Ukraine border from the Polish side remains such an easy task.
It is crucial for the governments of Ukraine and Poland to recognise the importance of close dialogue and effective mechanisms for resolving disputes.